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INTRODUCTION 
From the earliest days of the commercial Internet, corporate 
copyright owners have been trying to get Internet service providers 
(ISPs) to play a more active role in the seemingly Sisyphean task 
of online copyright enforcement.  Indeed, Congress recognized in 
1998, when it passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA), that active cooperation between the two sets of 
stakeholders would be necessary to ensure effective enforcement 
of copyrights in the digital environment.1  The DMCA, 
 
 1 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 72 (1998) (“Title II preserves strong incentives for 
service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright 
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accordingly, sought to balance the burdens and interests of 
copyright owners and ISPs by establishing a fairly clear division of 
labor: copyright owners are charged with monitoring networks and 
services for infringing content, and ISPs are charged with promptly 
removing that content when they become aware of it and are 
situated to remove or disable access to it.2  While the DMCA’s 
statutory division of labor has worked relatively well over the 
years to manage large-scale infringement on services that store 
content for users, it has not worked well to manage infringement 
over peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks.3  This is due in large 
part to a basic mismatch between the decentralized network 
architecture of P2P systems and the DMCA’s assumption of a 
more centralized architecture in which ISPs host content uploaded 
by users.4 
In 2008, in recognition of the DMCA’s inadequacy in the face 
of P2P file sharing, and with the high-profile case of Arista 
 
infringements that take place in the digital networked environment.”); S. REP. NO. 105-
190, at 20 (1998) (same). 
 2 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006) (setting forth the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown 
framework); 17 U.S.C. § 512(m) (2006) (providing that ISPs are not required to monitor 
their services for infringement).  ISPs are also tasked under the DMCA with identifying 
alleged infringers to copyright owners who subpoena their identities and with 
implementing a program to terminate the accounts of repeat infringers. See 17 U.S.C. § 
512(h) (2006) (setting forth a framework for copyright owners to obtain pre-litigation 
subpoenas to identify alleged infringers); 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) (2006) (requiring ISPs to 
adopt and reasonably implement a program for terminating the access or accounts of 
repeat infringers). 
 3 See Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT. 
& TECH. L. 695, 695 (2011) (describing this problem at length as the DMCA’s failure to 
scale for P2P infringements); see also Jerome H. Reichman et al., A Reverse Notice and 
Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted 
Works, 22 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 981, 994 (2007) (concluding, with respect to storage 
providers, that “the past decade of experience with the DMCA notice and takedown 
regime suggests that a relatively balanced and workable solution to this particular dual-
use technology problem has been found”).  
 4 See Mark Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 101, 113 (2007) (remarking on the obsolescence of the DMCA’s safe harbors in 
light of P2P technology); Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of 
Internet Service Providers for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 
41 (2006) (“[The DMCA] was designed to address a mainly centralized architecture. . . . 
Peer-to-peer architecture, by contrast, is decentralized and allows users to search for files 
stored in the libraries of other users.”).  
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Records v. Lime Group5 pending in federal district court in New 
York, then New York State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo 
began pressuring broadband providers to agree voluntarily to play 
a greater role in fighting online infringement.6  Subsequently, at 
the national and international levels, the Obama administration 
endorsed the concept of privately negotiated collaborations 
between corporate rights owners and broadband providers.  On the 
national level, the White House Office of the Intellectual Property 
Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC) in successive annual strategic 
plans encouraged private sector partnerships to curb repeat 
infringement.7  On the international level, the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) negotiated—and the United States 
ultimately signed—the controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA), which contains a provision requiring parties 
to promote such partnerships.8  In addition, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), of which the 
United States is a member, promulgated a set of principles for 
Internet policy making in 2011 that encourages member countries 
 
 5 532 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  In the case, Arista Records and a dozen 
music industry co-plaintiffs sued the operators of the LimeWire P2P service for 
secondary copyright infringement.  The service would later be shut down by court order 
following a grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs. See Arista Records v. Lime 
Group, 715 F. Supp. 481, 492–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 6 See Bernadette Tansey, New Tactic Fights File Sharing, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 
2008, at C1 (“The [Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA)] said New York 
Attorney General Andrew Cuomo is helping the industry develop an alternative to its 
mass courtroom campaign by promoting its talks with Internet providers.”). 
 7 See OFFICE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2010 JOINT 
STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 17 (2010) (stating that 
“[t]he Administration believes that it is essential for the private sector . . . to work 
collaboratively . . . to seek practical and efficient solutions to address infringement”); 
OFFICE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2011 JOINT STRATEGIC 
PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 5 (2011) (stating that “[t]he 
Administration is committed to facilitating practical and efficient voluntary actions by the 
private sector”).  
 8 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement of 2011, art. 27, at E14–17, available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf.  The parties to 
ACTA are Australia, Canada, the European Union and its member states, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland and the United States.  
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to “foster voluntarily developed codes of conduct” within the 
private sector to curb illegal behaviors online.9 
In July of 2011, broadband providers finally bowed to the 
mounting political pressure and to changing economic realities in 
the business of corporate content ownership and delivery.10  Five 
of the largest telecommunications companies in the United States 
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with trade 
groups representing major corporate copyright owners.11  The 
MOU creates what the parties characterize as “a common 
framework of ‘best practices’ to effectively alert subscribers, 
protect copyrighted content and promote access to legal online 
content.”12  At the core of the common framework is the Copyright 
 
 9 OECD, OECD COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION ON PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNET POLICY 
MAKING 4, 7 (2011) (“These codes would be developed by voluntary participants in a 
multi-stakeholder process . . . [and] should encourage and facilitate voluntary co-
operative efforts by the private sector to . . . address illegal activity . . . taking place over 
the Internet.”). 
 10 The 2011 merger between Comcast, traditionally a conduit for content, and NBC 
Universal, traditionally an owner of rights in content, is a prime example of the 
substantial realignment of interests that has occurred between broadband providers and 
corporate copyright owners in the fifteen years since the DMCA became law. See 
Annemarie Bridy, ACTA and the Specter of Graduated Response, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 558, 571–72(2011) [hereinafter Bridy, ACTA] (discussing the rise of streaming-
over-broadband and the blurring lines of demarcation between corporate content 
producers and corporate network operators).  At the 2010 State of the Net Conference, 
Comcast CEO Brian Roberts acknowledged a significant merger-induced shift in 
Comcast’s corporate perspective on online copyright enforcement: “The whole question 
of piracy, we are now going to be on both sides of that issue.” See Kenneth Corbin, 
Comcast Set to Enter Copyright Wars, DATAMATION.COM (Jan. 27, 2010), 
http://www.datamation.com/cnews/article.php/3861096/Comcast-Set-to-Enter-Copyright 
-Wars.htm (quoting Roberts). 
 11 The participating ISPs are AT&T, Verizon, Comcast, CSC Holdings (Cablevision), 
and Time Warner. See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 24 (Attachment A) (July 6, 
2011) [hereinafter MOU], available at http://www.copyrightinformation.org/sites/default/ 
files/Momorandum%20of%20Understanding.pdf.  The participating corporate rights 
owners are members of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) (Disney, 
Paramount, Sony, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal, and Warner Bros.) and the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) (UMG, Warner, Sony, and EMI). 
See id. at 25 (Attachment B).  Groups representing independent filmmakers and artists—
the American Association of Independent Music (A2IM) and the Independent Film and 
Television Alliance (IFTA)—are also included. See id. at 2. 
 12 See Press Release, Ctr. for Copyright Info., Music, Movie, TV and Broadband 
Leaders Team to Curb Online Content Theft Announce Common Framework for 
“Copyright Alerts” (July 7, 2011), available at http://infojustice.org/archives/4145. 
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Alert System (CAS), a domestic graduated response system that 
differs in significant respects from the controversial “three strikes” 
model currently operating in several countries abroad, most 
notably in France.13  CAS is a privately designed and administered 
enforcement system to which members of the public opt in through 
contractual terms of service with their broadband providers.14  It 
applies only to users of residential broadband services and is 
intended to address infringement only over P2P networks.15 
This Article is an assessment of CAS with respect to five 
norms that are central to consumer protection in the enterprise of 
online copyright enforcement: freedom of expression, privacy, 
fairness, proportionality, and transparency.  Part I provides an 
introduction to graduated response, which is the genus of online 
copyright enforcement to which CAS belongs.  Part II takes a 
comparative look at two pre-existing graduated response systems: 
the government mandated and administered program in France, 
Hadopi, and a privately administered program in Ireland run by the 
broadband provider Eircom.  Part III provides a detailed 
explanation of CAS, including its governance structure, the 
graduated system of warnings and sanctions it employs, and the 
appeal process it makes available to accused infringers.  Part IV 
evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of CAS with respect to 
each of the five norms listed above, using the systems in France 
and Ireland as reference points.16 
 
 13 See MOU, supra note 11, at 1 (introducing the idea of “[a] reasonable alert-based 
approach”); see also id. at 7–14 (setting forth the technical requirements of CAS).  The 
French system will be discussed in Part II.A infra. 
 14 See MOU, supra note 11, at 7 (requiring party ISPs to amend their terms of service 
or acceptable use policies to incorporate CAS). 
 15 See id. at 2 (defining the scope of the program). 
 16 I have omitted competition from the list, although it is a decidedly important 
consumer value, because any detailed discussion of the antitrust implications of the 
formation of CCI and the operation of CAS is beyond the scope of this project.  
Questions about the legality of CCI and CAS under antitrust law are very much alive and 
are currently being explored by others. See Timothy B. Lee, What the 1930s Fashion 
Industry Tells Us About Big Content’s “Six Strikes” Plan, ARS TECHNICA (July 28, 
2011), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/07/what-the-1930s-fashion-industry-
means-for-big-contents-six-strikes-plan. 
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I. THE GRADUATED RESPONSE PARADIGM 
This Part begins with a general discussion of graduated 
response and then goes on to consider its origins in U.S. copyright 
policy and its rise to prominence on the global enforcement agenda 
of corporate rights owners. 
A. Graduated Response Generally 
Graduated response is designed to address the phenomenon of 
repeat infringement over digital networks.  In general, graduated 
response involves a series of warnings that culminate in the 
imposition of a sanction or sanctions intended to deter future 
infringements.17  The most common form of graduated response is 
the “three strikes and you’re out” model, in which a user’s Internet 
access is suspended by his or her ISP following the receipt of three 
successive notices of copyright infringement over a set period of 
time.18  Shared enforcement between rights owners and ISPs is the 
hallmark of graduated response, although the precise division of 
labor between the two sides with respect to traffic monitoring and 
user notification can vary from one implementation to the next.19 
B. The Domestic Roots of Graduated Response 
The domestic roots of graduated response can be traced back to 
the DMCA and its “repeat infringer” provision, which conditions 
an ISP’s eligibility for safe harbor from claims of secondary 
copyright infringement on the ISP’s adoption and implementation 
of a policy that provides for termination of access for repeat 
 
 17 See IFPI, DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2011: MUSIC AT THE TOUCH OF A BUTTON 18 
(2011) (defining graduated response). 
 18 See generally Peter Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373 (2010) 
(describing the “three strikes” model). 
 19 See Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in 
Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV. 81, 84 (2010) [hereinafter Bridy, 
Graduated Response].  The most controversial protocol proposed by industry trade 
groups is an ISP-centric one that involves automated in-network monitoring and blocking 
of copyrighted files.  Some U.S. colleges and universities have already adopted in-
network filtering to comply with the Higher Education Act, which, since 2008, has 
conditioned participation in federal student aid programs on an institution’s development 
of copyright enforcement plans that include technology-based deterrents to online 
infringement. See 20 U.S.C.S. § 1094(a)(29)(A) (LexisNexis 2009); 34 C.F.R. § 668.14 
(2010). 
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infringers.20  Unlike the notice and takedown provision in the 
DMCA, which applies to service providers that store data for users 
but not to those that simply route and transmit their users’ data, the 
repeat infringer provision applies equally to all ISPs, including 
broadband providers.21 
Given the high volume of illegal file sharing online, one might 
expect broadband providers’ compliance with the repeat infringer 
provision to result fairly routinely in account terminations for P2P 
users.  In practice, however, that has not been the case.  
Establishing precisely what the DMCA requires of ISPs with 
respect to repeat infringement has been difficult for two reasons: 
first, the statute does not define what a repeat infringer is; second, 
courts have been deferential to service providers concerning the 
substance and form of their individual repeat infringer policies.22  
While at least one broadband provider has reported terminating 
access under the DMCA for the small number of subscribers who 
fail to heed repeated warnings concerning illegal file sharing, 
others have taken the entirely defensible position that they will not 
terminate a subscriber’s access absent a court order identifying the 
subscriber as a repeat infringer.23  The upshot is that there is no 
 
 20 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2006); Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
 21 Providers that perform routing and transmission services for users are covered by the 
safe harbor in section 512(a) of the DMCA, which governs transitory digital network 
communications.17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006).  Section 512(a) providers are not subject to 
the notice and takedown framework outlined in section 512(c). See In re Charter 
Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that section 512(a) does not 
require compliance with the DMCA’s notice and takedown provisions).  Providers that 
store information at the direction of users are covered by the safe harbor in section 512(c) 
and are subject to the notice and takedown framework set forth in that section. See 17 
U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006).  All providers seeking safe harbor under the DMCA are subject 
to section 512(i), which is the repeat infringer provision. See Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 481 
F.3d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that “[t]o be eligible for any of the four safe 
harbors at §§ 512(a)–(d), a service provider must first meet the threshold conditions set 
out in § 512(i)”). 
 22 See Bridy, Graduated Response, supra note 19, at 91 (discussing why the repeat 
infringer provision has not led to large numbers of account terminations for repeat 
infringers).  
 23 Cox Communications admitted publicly that it has terminated subscriber access in a 
very limited number of cases. See Sarah McBride, Relationship Status of RIAA and ISPs: 
It’s Complicated, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Mar. 26, 2009, 3:07 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
digits/2009/03/26/relationship-status-of-riaa-and-isps-its-complicated.  AT&T has said 
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statutory requirement for graduated response in the United States, 
although an ISP’s adoption of a three strikes protocol or some 
variant thereof would be sufficient for DMCA compliance.24  
Without any clear direction from the statute itself or from courts 
interpreting it, broadband providers and copyright owners have 
lived for some time with irreconcilable differences over what it 
takes to comply.  ISPs have thus had little incentive to interpret the 
requirements for compliance in ways that might alienate 
subscribers or raise the cost of doing business. 
In the United States, privately ordered graduated response has 
been the entertainment industries’ preferred plan for dealing with 
P2P infringement since the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA) ended its multi-year campaign of litigation 
against individual file sharers in 2008.25  At that time, 
entertainment industry representatives and their counterparts in the 
broadband industry were lobbying energetically against net 
neutrality regulation that threatened to prevent ISPs from 
implementing technical measures—filtering and protocol-based 
throttling, for example—to control network congestion caused in 
part by P2P file sharing.26  With the increasing popularity of legal 
 
that it will not terminate a customer’s service for repeat infringement without a court 
order. See Greg Sandoval, How Charter Communications Warns Accused File Sharers, 
CNET (Apr. 19, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10222853-93.html. 
 24 See Bridy, Graduated Response, supra note 19, at 100–03 (explaining the 
relationship between graduated response and DMCA compliance). 
 25 See Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL 
ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html 
(reporting on the transition from litigation to graduated response); Nate Anderson, RIAA 
Graduated Response Plan: Q&A with Cary Sherman, ARS TECHNICA (Dec. 21, 2008), 
http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2008/12/riaa-graduated-response-plan-qa-with-
cary-sherman (interviewing the RIAA’s Cary Sherman about graduated response). 
 26 See e.g., The Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2008: Hearing on H.R. 5353 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Telecomms. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and 
Commerce, 110th Cong. 1 (2008) (written statement of Mitch Bainwol, Chairman and 
CEO, RIAA), available at http://76.74.24.142/F382DD78-ECE4-2026-BD0C-
33C4ED1A0D44.pdf (“Our view is that the marketplace is generally a better mechanism 
than regulation for addressing such complex issues as how to address online piracy.”); 
Grant Gross, AT&T Accused of “Astroturfing” on Net Neutrality, PCWORLD (Oct. 20, 
2009), https://www.pcworld.com/article/173988/atandt_accused_of_astroturfing_on_net_ 
neutrality.html (reporting on AT&T’s efforts to bolster opposition to proposed net 
neutrality regulations); Saul Hansell, Hollywood Wants Internet Providers to Block 
Copyrighted Files, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2008), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/ 
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streaming services and Internet-enabled high-definition TVs, ISPs 
seeking to optimize bandwidth usage discovered a powerful new 
incentive to collaborate with copyright owners to curb illegal P2P 
traffic.27  Out of this mutuality of interests, and an agreement to let 
sleeping dogs lie when it comes to repeat infringers and the 
DMCA, the MOU was born.28 
Based on public statements by industry representatives, the 
MOU was a little over three years in the making, with serious 
negotiations getting underway in the spring and summer of 2008.29  
In December of 2008, the RIAA prematurely went public with 
news of a deal, which prompted some pointed denials from the 
broadband industry.30  It seems probable that some agreement in 
principle had been reached by that point, but the devil being in the 
details, broadband providers were not yet willing to commit 
publicly to the inter-industry partnership.  Their reticence on the 
matter ended with the press release announcing the MOU in July 
of 2011.31 
C. The Global Campaign for Graduated Response 
The international campaign for graduated response was already 
in high gear by the time Andrew Cuomo brought U.S.-based ISPs 
to the table with corporate rights owners in 2008.  An official 
 
25/hollywood-tries-to-get-support-for-having-isps-block-copyrighted-files (reporting on 
the formation of the inter-industry lobbying group Arts + Labs). 
 27 See Bridy, Graduated Response, supra note 19, at 105.  
 28 The parties to the MOU expressly provide that the agreement “does not and is not 
intended to create any obligation on a Participating ISP to . . . implement, enforce, or 
otherwise take any action in furtherance of a DMCA Termination Policy.” MOU, supra 
note 11, at 9 n.1.  Another provision affirms that no step undertaken by ISPs to comply 
with the terms of the MOU “alters, expands, or otherwise affects any Participating ISP’s 
rights or obligations under the DMCA.” Id. at 7. 
 29 See Anderson, supra note 25 (quoting Cary Sherman, who stated that discussions 
with broadband providers about graduated response had been going on for about a year 
(i.e., since 2007), but had picked up during the spring and summer (i.e., of 2008)).  
According to the IFPI, negotiations lasted for two years. See IFPI, supra note 17, at 21. 
 30 See Chloe Albanesius, Comcast, Others Deny “Three Strikes” Piracy Plan, 
PCMAG.COM (Mar. 27, 2009, 11:54 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817, 
2343977,00.asp; David Kravets, Top Internet Providers Cool to RIAA 3-Strikes Plan, 
WIRED (Jan. 5, 2009, 11:43 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/01/draft-
verizon-o. 
 31 See Ctr. for Copyright Info., supra note 12. 
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declaration released during the 2005 Cannes Film Festival by the 
European Union’s (EU) culture and audiovisual ministers touted 
graduated response as “a major step forward” in the “exchange of 
best practices in the fight against piracy” and concluded that it 
would be “useful” for European governments “[t]o foster 
agreements between rights holders and access providers.”32  The 
meeting that produced the Cannes Declaration brought film and 
telecommunications industry executives together with European 
culture ministers under the auspices of the French Ministry for 
Culture and Communications and the EU Information Society 
Commissioner to discuss the future of online film distribution for 
European filmmakers.33  In the European campaign to promote 
graduated response, the French took the lead in what then 
President Nicolas Sarkozy characterized as a crusade to “civilize” 
the Internet.34  For his outspoken public support of graduated 
response legislation and, even more controversially, in-network 
filtering, Sarkozy earned public praise from the International 
Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI).35 
In 2006, a report on intellectual property policy commissioned 
by the government of the United Kingdom (UK) recommended 
that ISPs voluntarily adopt a “Best Common Practice (BCP) 
document” for coordinating with rights owners “to remove and 
disbar users engaged in ‘piracy.’”36 The report also recommended 
that legislation mandating user disconnection be introduced if a 
voluntary agreement could not be achieved by the end of 2007.37  
As events actually played out, the British government pressed for 
 
 32 Declaration of the European Ministers for Audiovisual Affairs and the Member of 
the Commission in charge of Information Society and Media attending the 2005 Europe 
Day at Cannes (May 17, 2005), http://ec.europa.eu/avpolicy/docs/other_actions/ 
cannes_decl_2005_en.pdf.  
 33 See id.; see also MONICA HORTEN, THE COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT ENIGMA: 
INTERNET POLITICS AND THE “TELECOMS PACKAGE” 84 (2012). 
 34 See Milton U. Müller, Activists Fear Sarkozy’s Efforts to Tame Web, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE INT’L (May 24, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/ 
0,1518,764305,00.html.  
 35 See Jacqui Cheng, French Cabinet Backs “Educational” Three-Strikes Law, ARS 
TECHNICA (June 20, 2008), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2008/06/frances-
three-strikes-copyright-law-gets-cabinet-support.ars. 
 36 HM TREASURY, THE GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 103 (2006).  
 37 See id. 
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and brokered an MOU in 2008 between copyright industry trade 
groups and ISPs in which the parties agreed to work toward a 
significant reduction in P2P file sharing.38  That MOU expired in 
2009, however, after a three-month trial period.39  Following the 
expiration of the MOU, copyright owners continued to press for 
government intervention, and passage of the Digital Economy Act 
of 2010 (DEA) made inter-industry cooperation the law.40  The 
DEA gives Ofcom, Britain’s telecommunications regulator, 
responsibility for approving or making (if none is submitted for 
approval) an initial code of obligations for ISPs to follow.41  The 
DEA contemplates at minimum a notice regime and gives the 
Secretary of State authority to phase in additional obligations for 
ISPs, including a mandate to disconnect repeat infringers, if a 
notice-only regime proves ineffective.42  Through the DEA, the 
British government has established a co-regulatory framework 
within which regulators will monitor ISP compliance with an 
industry-developed, government-approved code of conduct and 
will impose additional obligations on ISPs if specified reductions 
 
 38 See Andrew Orlowski, Feargal Sharkey on the ISP Filesharer MoU, THE REGISTER 
(July 24, 2008, 10:16 AM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/07/24/feargal_music_isp_ 
mou (reporting that minister Baroness Vadera at the Department for Business, Enterprise 
& Regulatory Reform intervened to bring about the deal and that Ofcom agreed to act as 
an “honest broker” between ISPs and rights owners in the negotiation of the MOU). 
 39 See CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, INTERNET CO-REGULATION 210 (2011). 
 40 See id. at 211–14 (describing events leading to the passage of the DEA); Digital 
Economy Act, 2010, c. 24 (U.K.). 
 41 See Digital Economy Act, 2010, c. 24, §§ 5–6 (U.K.); Digital Economy Act, 2010, 
c. 24, Explanatory Notes, ¶ 32 (U.K.) (“The obligations will be underpinned by a code 
approved by OFCOM or, if no industry code is approved, made by OFCOM.  The code 
will set out in detail how the obligations must be met.”). 
 42 See Digital Economy Act, 2010, c. 24, §§ 3–18 (setting forth “initial obligations” 
that include subscriber notification and authorizing the Secretary of State to impose 
additional “technical obligations” on ISPs); Digital Economy Act, 2010, c. 24, 
Explanatory Notes, ¶ 33 (“In case the initial obligations prove insufficient to reduce 
significantly the level of online infringement of copyright, the provisions also grant the 
Secretary of State a power to impose further obligations (“technical obligations”) on 
ISPs. . . . Technical measures could only be used against subscribers who met the 
threshold for inclusion in a copyright infringement list under the initial obligations.  
Technical measures would be likely to include bandwidth capping or shaping that would 
make it difficult for subscribers to continue file-sharing, but other measures may also be 
considered.  If appropriate, temporary suspension of broadband connections could be 
considered.”). 
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in file sharing volumes are not timely achieved.43  The English 
have thus taken a graduated approach to graduated response.44 
The concerted push for legislative mandates in France and the 
UK unfolded within the broader context of the EU 
telecommunications framework review, which began in 2007 and 
concluded in 2009 with the European Parliament’s approval of the 
Telecoms Package.45  At the outset, the copyright industries 
viewed the telecoms framework review process as an opportunity 
to push for a Europe-wide, top-down graduated response 
mandate.46  The simple version of the highly fraught political 
narrative that unfolded is that various provisions requiring ISPs to 
sanction users for copyright infringement were proposed and 
debated, but they were ultimately defeated due to concerns among 
members of the EU parliament about freedom of expression, 
privacy, and due process of law.47  In the end, individual member 
states were left to decide whether to require ISPs to implement 
graduated response.48  The final Telecoms Package did, however, 
incorporate language intended to insure that the individual rights 
and fundamental freedoms of Internet users will not be sacrificed 
 
 43 See MARSDEN, supra note 39, at 54 (defining co-regulation as a middle ground 
between direct government regulation of industry and industry self-regulation); see also 
Digital Economy Act, 2010, c. 24, Explanatory Notes, ¶ 31 (“The Act includes provisions 
concerned with online infringement of copyright.  This is particularly, but not 
exclusively, in response to infringement of copyright in the fields of music, film and 
games.  The Act inserts new sections . . . which, once a supporting code approved or 
made by OFCOM has been put in place, impose obligations on internet service providers 
(“ISPs”) who meet the criteria set out in the code.”). 
 44 See generally Anne Barron, “Graduated Response” à l’Anglaise: Online Copyright 
Infringement and the Digital Economy Act of 2010, 3 J. MEDIA L. 305 (2011) (providing 
a very thorough discussion of the DEA).  
 45 See HORTEN, supra note 33, at 64–69 (2012) (offering a painstaking, document-
driven analysis of the EU telecom reform process and how it came to be dominated by 
debates over graduated response and ISP secondary liability for online copyright 
infringement). 
 46 See id. at 103. 
 47 See id. at 122–25, 191–95.  
 48 See HORTEN, supra note 33, at 213–14.  The amendment that was ultimately adopted 
“neither mandates nor prohibits” national graduated response regimes.  Directive 
2009/136, art. 1, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11, 21 (EC). 
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to the interests of copyright owners in member states that do elect 
to implement mandatory graduated response regimes.49 
In addition to lobbying in individual European capitals and the 
EU’s de facto capital of Brussels, the copyright industries have 
lobbied aggressively for graduated response in the international 
trade policy arena, where their collective interests are represented 
by the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA).50  In 
addition to dispatching its representatives to testify before national 
legislatures considering adopting graduated response mandates,51 
the IIPA participates annually in the USTR’s Special 301 process 
for identifying foreign countries that may be candidates for trade 
sanctions for failing to protect and enforce American intellectual 
property rights.52  The IIPA’s annual Special 301 report typically 
takes a wide array of individual governments to task for failing to 
use their power to combat digital piracy by creating strong legal 
incentives for ISPs to cooperate with copyright owners.53  Since 
2009, the IIPA has used the Special 301 process to focus its 
members’ disapproval on individual governments, including 
among others those of Sweden, Japan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore.54 
 
 49 See Directive 2009/136, art. 1, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11, 21 (EC) (“National measures 
regarding end-users’ access to, or use of, services and applications through electronic 
communications networks shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural 
persons, including in relation to privacy and due process, as defined in Article 6 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”). 
 50 Members of the IIPA include the RIAA and the MPAA in addition to the Business 
Software Alliance (BSA), the Association of American Publishers (AAP), the 
Entertainment Software Association (ESA), the Independent Film & Television Alliance 
(IFTA), and the National Music Publishers’ Association (NMPA). See Description of the 
IIPA, IIPA, http://www.iipa.com/aboutiipa.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).                                                                                     
 51 New Zealand is a case in point. See generally SUBMISSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE ON THE COPYRIGHT (INFRINGING FILE SHARING) 
AMENDMENT BILL BEFORE THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
COMMERCE, June 16, 2010, available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/NewZealandIIPA 
SubmissionOnFileSharing061610.PDF.  
 52 See generally Special 301, IIPA, http://www.iipa.com/special301.html (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2012) (linking to transcripts of recent legislative testimony and to press releases 
outlining IIPA’s recommended sanctions). 
 53 See generally id. 
 54 See id.  
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The IIPA was successful—although not nearly as successful as 
it would have liked—at having language promoting graduated 
response incorporated into ACTA.55  During ACTA’s negotiations, 
there was concern among civil society groups and other observers 
that the agreement would contain a binding requirement for 
signatories to legislate graduated response into their domestic 
copyright regimes.56  Although the final agreement does not 
contain a DMCA-style repeat infringer provision or a mandate for 
graduated response legislation, it does require signatories “to 
endeavor to promote cooperative relationships within the business 
community to effectively address [online copyright 
infringement].”57  Such language implies graduated response to 
anyone familiar with the rhetoric crafted to sell the concept to 
policy makers.58 
A mandatory repeat infringer provision may yet end up in the 
final text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, 
another multilateral trade agreement, for which negotiations began 
in 2009.59  A leaked draft of the TPP contains a repeat infringer 
provision virtually identical to the one in the DMCA.60  The same 
 
 55 See Bridy, ACTA, supra note 10, at 561 (“The official draft text of ACTA, released 
on April 21, 2010 (“the April draft”), confirmed that mandatory graduated response was 
no longer on the table for the negotiating parties by the end of the eighth round.  What 
remained, however, was a more general provision that conditioned ISP eligibility for safe 
harbor from claims of third party infringement on ‘an online service provider adopting 
and reasonably implementing a policy . . . to address unauthorized storage or 
transmission of materials protected by copyright.’ Such a policy presumably might, 
though it needn’t necessarily, entail graduated response.”). 
 56 See id. at 561 (observing that the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
announced publicly in a press release that “no participant is proposing to require 
governments to mandate a ‘graduated response’ or ‘three strikes’ approach to copyright 
infringement on the Internet”). 
 57 Id. at 569–70 (quoting from ACTA’s final text). 
 58 See id. at 570 (asserting that “cooperation” has become something of a code word 
for graduated response). 
 59 The United States in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011/november/ 
united-states-trans-pacific-partnership (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).  The parties to the 
TPP are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, 
Vietnam, and the United States. See id. 
 60 Compare Trans-Pacific Partnership Intellectual Property Rights Chapter Draft—
February 10, 2011 , 34, http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-text-ipr-
chapter.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (“Eligibility for limitations . . . shall be 
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provision appeared in early drafts of ACTA.61  The TPP 
negotiating process has thus given copyright owners a second bite 
at the apple when it comes to their global ambitions for graduated 
response.  It is difficult to predict whether their persistence will 
pay off. 
It is clear, however, from the debates surrounding both ACTA 
and the EU Telecoms Package that the global push for graduated 
response has met with pushback.  The governments of Germany 
and Spain rejected graduated response even as legislation requiring 
it advanced elsewhere within the EU.62  Moreover, the United 
Nations (UN) General Assembly and the EU’s Data Protection 
Supervisor have both criticized the approach in official reports.  In 
2011, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression 
expressed “alarm” from a civil liberties perspective at proposals to 
disconnect Internet users for violations of intellectual property 
rights.63  In 2010, in connection with the ACTA negotiation 
process, the European Data Protection Supervisor issued a formal 
opinion stating that graduated response procedures for monitoring 
user data transmissions and identifying alleged infringers to rights 
 
conditioned on the service provider . . . adopting and reasonably implementing a policy 
that provides for termination in appropriate circumstances of the accounts of repeat 
infringers.”), with 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2006) (“The limitations on liability . . . shall 
apply . . . only if the service provider . . . has adopted and reasonably implemented . . . a 
policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and 
account holders of the service provider’s system or network who are repeat infringers.”). 
 61 See Bridy, ACTA, supra note 10, at 562–63. 
 62 See Jacqui Cheng, Germany Says “Nein” To Three-Strikes Infringement Plan, ARS 
TECHNICA (Feb. 6, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2009/02/germany-
walks-away-from-three-strikes-internet-policy.ars (explaining the German government’s 
decision that graduated response would be too invasive and would potentially conflict 
with domestic privacy laws); Howell Llewellyn, “Three-Strikes” Off Anti-Piracy Agenda 
in Spain, BILLBOARD.BIZ (June 22, 2009), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_ 
display/industry/e3i8071e0d9c25cb6b876d3771fb7e3d102 (reporting on the Spanish 
government’s refusal to implement a graduated response scheme).  
 63 Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression, Human Rights Council, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 
2011). 
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owners are “highly invasive” of individuals’ privacy and should be 
abandoned in favor of less intrusive, more proportional measures.64 
II. IN THE EU: TWO TAKES ON “THREE STRIKES” 
This Part considers “three strikes” implementations of 
graduated response in two European Union (EU) countries: France 
and Ireland.  The French system, Hadopi, has been operational 
since 2010.65  Named for the government agency that administers 
it, its acronym translates roughly as the High Authority for the 
Distribution of Works and the Protection of Rights on the Internet.  
The Irish system, administered privately by Ireland’s largest ISP, 
Eircom, also dates to 2010.66  It exists and operates pursuant to the 
terms of a legal settlement between Eircom and members of the 
Irish Recorded Music Association (IRMA), which sued Eircom for 
secondary copyright infringement in 2008.67  These two systems 
make for an interesting contrast between a public law 
implementation of graduated response, which was subject to 
constitutional scrutiny before it took effect, and a private law 
implementation, which was not.  Significantly, neither 
implementation requires in-network filtering of traffic by ISPs, 
which is the holy grail of enforcement for the copyright industries 
and the most problematic potential development for consumers 
from the perspectives of privacy and expressive rights. 
 
 64 See Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Current 
Negotiations by the European Union of an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 
2010 O.J. (C 147) 3, 5 [hereinafter Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor].  
 65 See Hadopi Enregistre Ses Premières Plaintes, L’EXPRESS (July 30, 2010), 
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/hadopi-enregistre-ses-premieres-plaintes_ 
909663.html (announcing the publication of the official decree requisite for the start of 
operations).  
 66 See Press Release, Eircom, Statement on Illegal File Sharing, 
http://pressroom.eircom.net/press_releases/article/eircom_Statement_on_Illegal_File_Sha
ring.  
 67 See Tim Healy, Eircom May Face Music in Illegal Files Row, INDEPENDENT.IE 
(March 11, 2008), http://www.independent.ie/national-news/eircom-may-face-music-in-
illegal-files-row-1313154.html (reporting on the filing of the lawsuit). 
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A. Graduated Response as Public Law: The French Example 
(Hadopi) 
The seeds for graduated response in France were sown in 2004, 
when the topic was broached in a report of France’s High Council 
of Literary and Artistic Property.68  The report recommended 
implementation of a system requiring broadband providers to send 
a specific number of warnings to users suspected of infringement, 
after which a fine would be imposed.69  When France amended its 
copyright law in 2006 in compliance with EU directive 
2001/29/CE, requiring harmonization of copyright law throughout 
the EU, it did not incorporate graduated response into the new 
law.70  Rights owners persisted, however, and found a champion in 
President Sarkozy, who appointed a commission to develop a 
graduated response policy for France.  In 2007, the commission 
submitted a report proposing the creation of an administrative body 
to oversee a system of warnings and sanctions for repeat 
infringers.71  The report was followed in 2008 by the introduction 
of legislation creating that administrative body, Hadopi.72  Under 
the original version of the legislation, Hadopi was to be 
responsible for implementing a graduated response system in 
which three warning letters would be followed by a suspension of 
the accused subscriber’s Internet access for a maximum of one 
year.73  Debate over the bill was intense both inside and outside the 
French parliament, with the greatest degree of controversy 
surrounding privacy and due process issues.74  After passage of the 
bill in 2009, opponents challenged its constitutionality, and the 
French Constitutional Council ruled that a user’s Internet access 
 
 68 See Thierry Rayna & Laura Barbier, Fighting Consumer Piracy with Graduated 
Response: An Evaluation of the French and British Implementations, 6 INT’L J. 
FORESIGHT & INNOVATION POL’Y 294, 299 (2010).  
 69 See id.  
 70 See id. at 300. 
 71 See id.  
 72 See id.  
 73 See id. at 301. 
 74 See Les Députés Adoptent la Loi Hadopi, LE MONDE.FR (May 12, 2009, 9:10 PM), 
http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2009/05/12/les-deputes-adoptent-la-loi-
hadopi_1192219_651865.html; Marguerite Reardon, France Ignores EU and Passes 
Antipiracy Law, CNET NEWS (May 12, 2009, 12:43 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-
1023_3-10238912-93.html. 
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could not be suspended solely on the authority of an administrative 
body without a court order.75  To comply with the Council’s ruling, 
the Hadopi legislation was promptly amended, and the system was 
reconfigured to include an accelerated legal proceeding presided 
over by a judge.76  Under the amended law, the judge has authority 
to impose an access sanction without a hearing, but the affected 
subscriber has the right to an appeal at which he or she is 
represented.77 
An Internet security and content detection company selected by 
rights owners generates the notices of infringement in the Hadopi 
system.78  A notice contains relevant information concerning the 
alleged infringement: the IP address from which the files were 
available, the ISP of the alleged infringer, and the date and time of 
the alleged infringement.79  The notice is forwarded from the 
security company to the copyright owner, which then refers the 
incident to Hadopi.80  To protect the accused subscriber’s privacy, 
Hadopi forwards the notice to the subscriber without disclosing his 
or her identity to the copyright owner.81  If a subscriber is alleged 
 
 75 See Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2009-590DC, 
Oct. 22, 2009, Rec. 179 (Fr.).  The original version of the law did not require judicial 
review. See also Nicola Lucchi, Access to Network Services and Protection of 
Constitutional Rights: Recognizing the Essential Role of Internet Access for the Freedom 
of Expression, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 645, 662–64 (2011) (discussing in detail 
the Council’s decision and the underlying principles of French law). 
 76 See Loi 2ac009-1311 du 28 Octobre 2009 relative à la protection pénale de la 
propriété littéraire et artistique sur internet [Law 2009-1311 of October 28, 2009 
Regarding Criminal Protection for Intellectual Property on the Internet], JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Oct. 29, 
2009, p. 18290; see also CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C.P.I.] art. L331–21 
(Fr.). 
 77 See Rayna & Barbier, supra note 68, at 301. 
 78 See id. 
 79 See id.; see also Quelles informations me concernant sont détenues par l’Hadopi si 
je fais l’objet d’une procédure de réponse graduée?, HADOPI, 
http://www.hadopi.fr/quelles-informations-me-concernant-sont-detenues-par-lhadopi-si-
je-fais-lobjet-dune-procedure-de-rep (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (explaining what 
information concerning an alleged infringement is transmitted to Hadopi by the copyright 
owner). 
 80 See Rayna & Barbier, supra note 68, at 301; see also Réponse Graduée, HADOPI, 
http://www.hadopi.fr/usages-responsables/nouvelles-libertes-nouvelles-
responsabilites/reponse-graduee.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
 81 See Rayna & Barbier, supra note 68, at 301. 
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to have infringed on a second occasion within six months of 
receiving the first notice, Hadopi forwards a second notice.82  If a 
third infringement is alleged within a year of the second notice, 
Hadopi refers the matter to a prosecutor, and a judge can order the 
subscriber’s Internet access to be suspended.83  If the judge 
determines that the infringement was the result of a negligent 
failure on the subscriber’s part to secure his or her Internet 
connection, the suspension is limited to one month.84  If the judge 
determines that the infringement was not merely negligent, a one 
year suspension may be imposed.85  If the subscriber wants to 
contest the judge’s decision to suspend access, he or she can 
exercise the right to be heard on appeal.86 
Hadopi began sending notices to alleged infringers in October 
2010 at a reported rate of 25,000 per day.87  As of December 1, 
2011, over 750,000 first notices had been sent.88  According to an 
official report, 95% of those who received a first notice did not 
receive a second notice; 92% of those who received a second 
notice did not receive a third; and 98% of those who received a 
third notice had no subsequent contact with the system.89  As of 
September 2012, fourteen cases had been referred for prosecution, 
 
 82 See id. (citing CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C.P.I.] art. L331–25 (Fr.)); 
see also Comment fonctionne la réponse graduée?, HADOPI, http://www.hadopi.fr/ 
comment-fonctionne-la-reponse-graduee-0 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (explaining the 
protocol). 
 83 See Rayna & Barbier, supra note 68, at 301 (citing CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ 
INTELLECTUELLE [C.P.I.] art L335-7 (Fr.)); see also Comment fonctionne la réponse 
graduée?, supra note 82. 
 84 This can occur, for example, in a situation where the subscriber is a parent whose 
child is the accused infringer. See Rayna & Barbier, supra note 68, at 301 (citing CODE 
DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C.P.I.] art. L335-7-1 (Fr.)); Qu’est-ce que l’infraction 
de négligence caractérisée?, HADOPI, http://www.hadopi.fr/quest-ce-que-linfraction-de-
negligence-caracterisee (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
 85 See Rayna & Barbier, supra note 68, at 301.  During this period, the subscriber 
remains responsible for the regular price of the subscription and may not subscribe to 
another service. See id. at 301 n.13.  
 86 See id. at 301–02. 
 87 Aymeric Pichevin, French Anti-Piracy Scheme’s 25,000 Daily Reports, 
BILLBOARD.BIZ (Oct. 22, 2010), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content_display/industry/ 
news/e3i1c1499752deb3a60a1584400533395b0. 
 88 See HADOPI, HADOPI: 1 1/2 YEAR AFTER THE LAUNCH 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.hadopi.fr/sites/default/files/page/pdf/note17_en.pdf. 
 89 See id.  
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and the court had imposed a single fine amounting to a little under 
$200.90  Of more than 1,000 French Internet users between the 
ages of fifteen and fifty who were surveyed in November 2011, 
71% of those who used P2P networks stated that they would stop 
downloading content illegally if they received a notice from 
Hadopi.91  These figures suggest that Hadopi notices are having a 
meaningful deterrent effect on their recipients. 
With respect to Hadopi’s effect on file-sharing, the official 
report cites a study finding a 43% drop in illegal file sharing in 
France in 2011 and a drop in France’s contribution to global illegal 
file-sharing in 2011 from 6.2% to 4.5%.92  Hadopi attributes these 
decreases to its own success as a deterrent, but the numbers can as 
plausibly be attributed, at least in part, to an increase in illegal 
streaming and direct download (DDL) traffic, both of which use 
non-P2P transmission protocols.93  When increased illegal 
streaming and direct download traffic are taken into account, it is 
not so clear that the drop in P2P traffic observed in the study 
corresponds directly to a drop in online infringement.94  Users 
could just be migrating to different methods of online 
infringement—ones that the Hadopi system is unequipped to detect 
and mitigate.  Another plausible alternative explanation for at least 
some of the observed decrease in P2P traffic is increased reliance 
on virtual private networks and encryption by P2P users seeking to 
evade detection.95  When these alternative explanations are 
 
 90 See Peter Sayer, French Court Levies First Fine Under Three-Strikes Law on Illegal 
Downloads, PCWORLD (Sept. 13, 2012, 10:00 AM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/ 
262285/french_court_levies_first_fine_under_threestrikes_law_on_illegal_downloads. 
html. 
 91 See HADOPI, supra note 88, at 6. 
 92 See id. at 5. 
 93 See Benjamin Ferran, Le Bilan Contrasté de l’Action de l’Hadopi, LE FIGARO (Mar. 
28, 2012, 7:15 PM), http://www.lefigaro.fr/hightech/2012/03/27/01007-20120327 
ARTFIG00670-le-bilan-contrastee-de-l-action-de-l-hadopi.php (citing a 29% rise in 
Internet traffic to illegal streaming and direct download sites since Hadopi began sending 
notices to P2P users in October 2010).  
 94 See id; Monica Horten, Hadopi—Has it Massaged the Numbers?, IPTEGRITY.COM 
BLOG (Mar. 31, 2012), http://www.iptegrity.com/index.php/france/755-hadopi-has-it-
massaged-the-numbers. 
 95 See Horten, supra note 94 (stating that France Telecom noted a “marked increase” in 
encrypted traffic following the first round of Hadopi notices); Eric Pfanner, Copyright 
Cheats Face the Music in France, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2012), 
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considered, the argument that Hadopi has dramatically decreased 
the volume of online infringement loses some of its force. 
Another way to assess the impact of Hadopi on French 
consumer behavior is to try to measure the law’s effect on legal 
music sales.  The American economist Brett Danaher and his co-
authors took this approach, concluding in a report trumpeted by the 
IFPI that public awareness of Hadopi drove French consumers to 
legal (iTunes) downloads.96  Relying on data from the “big four” 
recording labels—EMI, Sony, Universal, Warner—and using sales 
trends in a selected group of European countries as a proxy for 
what sales would have been in France if Hadopi had not been 
enacted, the authors reported that public awareness of Hadopi 
caused a 25% increase in iTunes album sales in France.97  Time 
will tell whether the increased digital sales observed in the study 
will be sustained when Hadopi is no longer a focus of media 
attention in France, as it was for a significant period of time both 
before and after the law became effective.  Past studies on the 
effects of highly publicized file sharing lawsuits against individual 
downloaders in the United States showed only a short-term impact 
on illegal file sharing behavior.98  Danaher and his co-authors 
assert that Hadopi will be more effective than lawsuits at achieving 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/20/technology/20iht-piracy20.html?_r=1 (discussing 
the increased use of virtual private networks and anonymous browsing following 
Hadopi). 
 96 See BRETT DANAHER ET AL., THE EFFECT OF GRADUATED RESPONSE ANTI-PIRACY 
LAWS ON MUSIC SALES: EVIDENCE FROM AN EVENT STUDY IN FRANCE 2 (2012), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1989240.  Using a difference-in-
difference model, the authors estimated effects over a one-year time period—six months 
before and six months after the law became effective. See id. at 14 n.16.  Journalists for 
the French newspaper Le Monde have critiqued the study, suggesting some alternative 
explanations for the observed increase in iTunes sales, including the launch of new 
iPhone models and the holiday season. See Damien Leloup and Jérémie Baruch, Hadopi, 
Source de la Croissance d’iTunes?, LE MONDE.FR Jan. 24, 2012, 7:39 PM), 
http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2012/01/24/hadopi-source-de-la-croissance-
d-itunes_1633919_651865.html. 
 97 See DANAHER ET AL., supra note 96, at 2. 
 98 See Michael Bachmann, Lesson Spurned? Reactions of Online Music Pirates to 
Legal Prosecutions by the RIAA, 1 INT’L J. CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 213, 220 (2007) 
(concluding that an upward trend in downloading across all demographic groups between 
2003 and 2005 suggests that the deterrent effect of the RIAA’s lawsuits eroded over 
time). 
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long-term general deterrence, but their data do not go beyond May 
2011, which is only about six months after the first Hadopi notices 
were sent.99  It is possible, too, that Hadopi will be somehow 
restructured under the presidency of Sarkozy’s successor, the 
socialist François Hollande, who called for repeal during the 
presidential campaign but has since moderated his position.100 
B. Graduated Response as Private Law: The Irish Example 
(Eircom) 
In contrast with the government-administered system in 
France, Ireland’s graduated response system is privately 
administered.  As with CAS, the legal basis for the Irish system is 
a contractual arrangement between private parties.101  Unlike the 
MOU, however, which was negotiated outside the context of 
litigation, the agreement that produced the Eircom graduated 
response system was an agreement to end an ongoing legal 
dispute.102  After an eight day trial, Eircom and IRMA agreed in 
2009 to a settlement that required Eircom to implement a “three 
strikes” protocol.103  The case never went to judgment on the 
merits, so there is no copyright law on the books as a result of it,104 
yet the settlement has the reach and effect of public law: every one 
of Eircom’s 2.6 million subscribers is now bound through 
 
 99 See DANAHER ET AL., supra note 96, at 4, 8, 20–21. 
 100 See Christophe Auffray, Hadopi “Repensée”. Mais Que Veut Finalement François 
Hollande?, ZDNET.FR (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.zdnet.fr/actualites/hadopi-repensee-
mais-que-veut-finalement-francois-hollande-39769220.htm (reporting on the shift in 
Hollande’s views concerning Hadopi). 
 101 See EMI Records v. Eircom Ltd., [2010] IEHC 108, ¶ 1 (H. Ct.) (Ir.); Ireland 
Cracks Down on Internet Piracy, INDEPENDENT (May 29, 2010), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/ireland-cracks-down-on-internet-piracy-
1986733.html [hereinafter Ireland Cracks Down].  
 102 See EMI Records, [2010] IEHC 108, at ¶ 1. 
 103 See id. at ¶¶ 2, 9. 
 104 In a subsequent case, IRMA sought a court order requiring UPC, another Irish ISP, 
to implement a graduated response system like Eircom’s. See EMI Records v. UPC 
Communications, [2010] IEHC 377 (H. Ct.) (Ir.).  The Court denied the requested relief, 
pointing out that the agreement between Eircom and IRMA was not Irish law but “a 
private matter between the parties as a matter of contract . . . [that] was not authorised or 
ruled on by the Court.” Id. at ¶ 135. 
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Eircom’s Terms of Service to the terms of the Eircom-IRMA 
settlement.105 
The Eircom protocol was implemented on a preliminary basis 
beginning in June 2010 and on a permanent basis the following 
October.106  Upon receiving a first notice of infringement from a 
computer security firm hired by IRMA to monitor P2P networks 
for infringing content, Eircom informs its allegedly infringing 
subscriber that s/he has been caught in the act of illegal file 
sharing.107  This first warning is included with the subscriber’s 
monthly bill.108  Upon receipt of a second notice of infringement 
concerning the same subscriber, Eircom sends a separate letter to 
the subscriber that contains a strongly worded warning.109  The 
response escalates from the first level to the second level only if 
fourteen days or more have passed since the first infringement was 
alleged.110  Upon receipt of a third notice concerning the same 
subscriber, Eircom reviews the evidence against the subscriber.111  
As with the escalation from the first level of response to the 
second, fourteen days or more must pass before the response can 
graduate to the third level.112  The first two notices are generated 
automatically; the third notice, however, triggers a human review.  
Following human review, a notice of termination is sent to the 
subscriber, who has fourteen days to respond.113  Eircom considers 
the response, if any is received, in light of any extenuating 
circumstances the subscriber raises.  If the subscriber claims in his 
or her response that there was a mistake of fact concerning the 
alleged infringements, Eircom considers that claim as well.114  If 
Eircom does not find in favor of the subscriber, the subscriber’s 
Internet service is cut off for seven days.115  If the user continues to 
 
 105 See John Collins, Three Strikes Rule Aims to Knock Out Music Sharing, IRISH 
TIMES, June 4, 2010, at 6.  
 106 See Eircom, supra note 66; IFPI, supra note 17, at 18.  
 107 See EMI Records, [2010] IEHC 108, at ¶ 9. 
 108 See id. at ¶ 13. 
 109 See id. at ¶¶ 9, 13. 
 110 See id. at ¶ 13. 
 111 See id. 
 112 See id. 
 113 See id. 
 114 See id. 
 115 See Eircom, supra note 66 (setting forth sanctions under the protocol). 
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infringe, his or her service is disconnected for a year.116  No court 
order is required; the ISP is the sole arbiter of innocence or guilt.117 
As of December 2011, Eircom had issued 29,000 notices to its 
subscribers under the protocol.118  One hundred subscribers had 
reached the point of a seven-day suspension, and only twelve had 
reached the point of receiving a longer suspension.119  The 
dramatic drop-off in the number of subscribers progressing from 
one stage of the protocol to the next is consistent with statistics 
from Hadopi.  But unlike in France, where opposition to the 
Hadopi legislation in its initial form resulted in amendments 
ensuring judicial review of disconnection decisions, Eircom’s 
subscribers have no such guarantee.120  In this respect, privately 
designed and implemented graduated response protocols like 
Ireland’s (and CAS) are more problematic from the standpoint of 
consumer protection than publicly implemented ones.  To the 
extent that these regimes implicate rights and privileges protected 
by public law, waivers of those rights by users via “click through” 
standardized terms of service are legally enforceable, even if users 
have no choice of an alternative provider offering service on 
different terms.121  By signing up for broadband service, Eircom’s 
 
 116 See id. 
 117 See EMI Records, [2010] IEHC 108, at ¶¶ 14–15 (characterizing the protocol and its 
sanctions as consistent with Eircom’s terms of service regarding the suspension or 
termination of accounts). 
 118 See Mark Tighe, Eircom Cut Off 100 Illegal Downloaders, SUN. TIMES (Eng.), Mar. 
4, 2012, at 5. 
 119 See id.  
 120 See id. 
 121 The validity of consumers’ assent to the “fine print” in mass standardized 
agreements has been the subject of considerable scholarly debate, particularly when the 
terms are presented virtually in “clickwrap” or “browsewrap” form. Compare, e.g., Mark 
Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459 (2006) (discussing the “death of assent” in 
mass digital contracts), with RANDY E. BARNETT, Consenting to Form Contracts, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON CONTRACT LAW 171, 184 (2009) (arguing that even “invisible” terms in 
mass contracts can be justifiably enforced on the basis of “real consent properly 
understood.”); see also Margaret Jane Raden, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by 
Machine, 160 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 142 (2004) (examining and 
critiquing the rise of mass contract regimes through which the law of the state is 
superseded by the law of the firm).  
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subscribers consent to graduated response and surrender any 
conflicting public law guarantees.122 
The graduated response system spawned by the Eircom-IRMA 
settlement has not escaped legal challenges, however, including 
two regulatory interventions by Ireland’s Data Protection 
Commissioner alleging subscriber privacy violations.  In 2010, on 
the heels of the settlement, the Commissioner expressed the 
opinion that the settlement terms violated Irish data protection 
laws, prompting the Irish High Court to rule that copyright owners’ 
collection of subscribers’ Internet Protocol (IP) addresses during 
surveillance of P2P networks is lawful.123  The Court also ruled 
that the Eircom protocol contains adequate procedural protections 
and that Internet disconnection after three strikes is a proportional 
and justified restraint on fundamental freedoms relating to Internet 
access.124  Not considering the matter closed, the Commissioner 
acted again at the end of 2011, following a six-month investigation 
of consumer complaints arising from an incident in which 390 
subscribers were misidentified as infringers due to what Eircom 
characterized as a “minor technical issue.”125  In an enforcement 
notice, the Commissioner accused Eircom of, among other things, 
facilitating surveillance of users’ Internet traffic without their 
consent, improperly retaining and using data linking users’ 
identities to dynamically assigned IP addresses, and failing to 
ensure the accuracy of that data.126  The notice concluded with an 
 
 122 See EMI Records, [2010] IEHC 108, at ¶ 29 (“The insertion of express conditions by 
Eircom in the user-internet service provider contract . . . is no less than lawful and proper.  
It is abundantly clear that the [user] has given his or her consent in return for obtaining 
internet access.”).  
 123 See id. at ¶¶ 18, 25. 
 124 See id. at ¶ 27. 
 125 See Mary Carolan, Four Music Firms Dispute Data Chief’s Notice to Eircom, IRISH 
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2012, at 4; see also EMI Records v. Data Protection Commissioner, 
[2012] IEHC 264, ¶¶ 1.0, 1.3 (explaining that Eircom changed the clocks in its network 
to reflect daylight savings time two months late, thereby causing a mismatch between 
dynamically assigned IP addresses and subscriber accounts, which led to the delivery of 
erroneous notices of infringement).  
 126 Data Protection Comm’rs Enforcement Notice to Eircom Ltd. Pursuant to Section 10 
of the Data Protection Acts 1988 & 2003 and Regulation 17 of the European 
Communities (Electronic Communications Networks and Services) (Privacy and 
Electronic Communications) Regulations 2011, Dec. 5, 2011 (on file with author).  
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order for Eircom to stop administering the protocol.127  IRMA’s 
member companies promptly appealed, arguing that the order 
represented an attempt to re-litigate the data protection issues 
already decided by the High Court in 2010.128  In June 2012, the 
High Court invalidated the order because the accompanying 
enforcement notice failed to state an explicit legal rationale for the 
Commissioner’s action.129  To the extent that a rationale could be 
discerned in the notice, the court held, it rested on a 
misconstruction of the applicable law.130  Following an extended 
discussion of European Court of Justice (ECJ) precedents, and 
stressing the need to balance the competing rights of Internet users 
and intellectual property owners in the digital environment, the 
court concluded that accepting the Commissioner’s interpretation 
of EU privacy law would require the untenable holding that 
copyright may not be enforced on the Internet.131 
III. IN THE U.S.: SIX STRIKES (BUT YOU’RE PROBABLY NOT OUT) 
This Part describes in detail the substance of the graduated 
response MOU.  Subpart A summarizes the provisions creating the 
Center for Copyright Information (CCI), which is the co-governed 
private entity charged with macro-level administration and 
oversight of the Copyright Alert System (CAS).  Subpart B 
explains CAS itself, which is comprised of a standardized notice-
and-sanction protocol and a complementary process of third party 
non-judicial review. 
A. The Center for Copyright Information (CCI) 
The establishment of CCI is the first order of business 
addressed in the MOU.  As a public-facing entity, CCI is tasked 
 
 127 See Mark Tighe, Piracy Action Lands Eircom in Hot Water, SUN. TIMES (Eng.), 
Dec. 18, 2011, at 7. 
 128 See Carolan, supra note 125, at 4. 
 129 See EMI Records, [2012] IEHC, at ¶ 14.0. 
 130 See id. 
 131 See id. at ¶ 8.10 (“To sum up, it is clear that the state of the law was regrettably 
misconstrued by the Data Protection Commissioner.  In that respect, he is not to be 
faulted as the law is complex.  The law does not, however, set intellectual property rights 
at naught because of the involvement of the Internet.”). 
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primarily with educating a general audience about copyright law, 
the problem of online infringement, and legal sources of online 
content.132  It does this by means of a website to which the parties 
to the MOU contribute materials reflecting their perspective on the 
problem and their proffered solutions.133  As the center of gravity 
for the inter-industry partnership created by the MOU, CCI is also 
charged with assisting in the implementation and oversight of CAS 
and with promoting CAS to non-participating ISPs.134 
Reflecting the delicate balance of corporate interests involved 
in the MOU and its common framework for graduated response, 
contractual rights and duties concerning CCI are allocated equally 
between the participating ISPs and copyright owner 
representatives.135  Funding for CCI is split fifty-fifty, and the 
organization is governed by a six-member executive committee of 
which each group chooses three members.136  There is no public 
interest or copyright expert representation on the executive 
committee; however, the MOU requires the formation of a three-
member advisory board to be “drawn from relevant subject matter 
expert and consumer interest communities.”137  Under the terms of 
the MOU, each group appoints one member of the advisory board, 
and those two members together choose the third member.138  The 
executive committee is required to consult the advisory board on 
significant issues relating to the design and implementation of 
CAS, but the advisory board has no power to make binding 
recommendations.139  As Mary LaFrance has observed, the MOU 
provides no real guarantee that the advisory board will have any 
direct impact on CCI’s activities.140 
Members of CCI’s inaugural advisory board, which actually 
has four members instead of the anticipated three, include Jerry 
 
 132 See MOU, supra note 11, at 4. 
 133 See id. 
 134 See id. at 5. 
 135 See id.  
 136 See id. at 3–4.  
 137 Id. 
 138 See id. at 3. 
 139 See id. at 4.  
 140 See Mary LaFrance, Graduated Response by Industry Compact: Piercing the Black 
Box, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 165, 171 (2012).  
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Berman of the Center for Democracy and Technology and Gigi 
Sohn of Public Knowledge.141  The other two members are Marsali 
Hancock, the president of the iKeepSafe Coalition, which monitors 
digital technologies and their effect on children,142 and Jules 
Polenetsky of the Future of Privacy Forum.143  Berman and Sohn 
are nationally known Open Internet advocates whose organizations 
have long emphasized the need for balance in the protection and 
enforcement of digital copyrights.144  All four appointees have 
solid public interest credentials and occupy positions of genuine 
independence from the parties.  The appointments are a strong 
signal to the public that the parties to the MOU are actually serious 
about the need to balance systematic enforcement with consumer 
protection. 
In addition to appointing an advisory board, the CCI executive 
committee is required to retain independent technical experts and 
privacy experts to review the methods used by participating 
copyright owners to identify infringers and infringing content on 
P2P networks.145  According to the MOU, the retention of experts 
is intended to ensure and maintain the parties’ and the public’s 
confidence in the accuracy and security of those methods.146  Like 
the recommendations of the advisory board, however, any 
recommendations these experts make are confidential and non-
binding.147  The incentive created in the MOU for copyright 
 
 141 See Press Release, Ctr. for Copyright Info., Center for Copyright Information 
Announces Three Major Steps Towards Implementation (Apr. 2, 2012), 
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/node/705 [hereinafter Three Major Steps Press 
Release].  
 142 See id. 
 143 See id. 
 144 See, e.g., Digital Copyright, CDT, https://www.cdt.org/issue/digital-copyright (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2012) (asserting that “concern over copyright infringement does not 
justify policies that jeopardize the open architecture of the Internet or stifle innovation or 
legitimate free expression”); Key Issues: Balanced Copyright, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/issues/balanced-copyright (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) 
(“Public Knowledge promotes a balanced approach to copyright law and works to ensure 
that domestic and international copyright laws promote creativity and the free flow of 
knowledge.”). 
 145 See MOU, supra note 11, at 4–5.  
 146 See id. at 5. 
 147 See id. (“Failure to adopt a recommendation of the Independent Expert shall not 
amount to a breach under this Agreement.  The Independent Expert’s recommendations 
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owners to follow expert technical recommendations is a 
prohibition on sending notices of infringement to ISPs if the 
notices were generated using “fundamentally unreliable” 
methods.148  As of this writing CCI has not publicly identified its 
privacy experts.  Its “independent” technical expert is the firm 
Stroz Friedberg, a former lobbyist for the RIAA.149  The choice of 
Stroz Friedberg drew immediate fire from critics who rightfully 
questioned the firm’s ability to be truly independent in light of its 
past paid advocacy for corporate rights owners.150  Responding 
promptly and directly to this criticism, CCI announced that it 
would hire an additional—and presumably more independent—
independent technical expert.151  As this Article goes to press, the 
additional technical expert has not yet been named. 
B. The Copyright Alert System (CAS) 
The MOU contains a complete procedural specification for 
CAS but leaves the operational details to CCI, working in 
consultation with the parties, the advisory board, and the 
independent experts.152  While the details are legion, the basic 
bargain struck in the MOU is straightforward: Copyright owners 
agree to identify and provide ISPs with documented evidence of 
 
must be shared with each of the Content Owner Representatives and the affected 
Participating ISP, but may not be disclosed to other parties.”). 
 148 See MOU, supra note 11, at 5–6.  Whether that is a strong enough incentive will be 
addressed in Part IV, infra. 
 149 See The Copyright Alert System: Moving To Implementation, Ctr. for Copyright 
Information, Oct. 18, 2012, http://www.copyrightinformation.org/node/709 (announcing 
the selection of Stroz Friedberg as the independent technical expert); Six-Strikes 
“Independent Expert” Is RIAA’s Former Lobbying Firm, TORRENTFREAK (Oct. 22, 
2012), https://torrentfreak.com/six-strikes-independent-expert-is-riaas-former-lobbying-
firm-121022 (reporting on Stroz Friedberg’s prior business relationship with the RIAA). 
 150 See id. (criticizing the choice of Stroz Friedberg).  TorrentFreak reported that the 
RIAA did not disclose its prior relationship with Stroz Friedberg to its CCI partners. See 
RIAA Failed To Disclose Expert’s Lobbying History to “Six-Strikes” Partners, 
TORRENTFREAK (Oct. 27, 2012), https://torrentfreak.com/riaa-failed-to-disclose-experts-
lobbying-history-to-six-strikes-partners-121026.   
 151 See Jill Lesser, CCI Recommits to Independent Evaluation of Content Methodology, 
Ctr. for Copyight Info., Oct. 30, 2012, http://www.copyrightinformation.org/node/712 
(acknowledging the link between the RIAA and Stroz Friedberg and affirming CCI’s 
commitment to a genuinely independent assessment of the technology underlying CAS). 
 152 See MOU, supra note 11, at 3. 
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suspected individual infringements over P2P networks.  ISPs 
agree, in turn, to match detected instances of infringement with 
subscriber accounts, send warnings to the relevant subscribers, and 
impose sanctions on subscribers who fail to heed repeated 
warnings.153  The overarching goal, and perhaps the greatest 
operational challenge associated with CAS, is standardization of 
the system across ISPs.  Each ISP is responsible for establishing its 
own implementation plan and for taking that plan operational on a 
target launch date.154  Each ISP is also required to modify its terms 
of service for residential broadband to incorporate the notice-and-
sanction structure of CAS.155  As with the Eircom graduated 
response system, the CAS protocol becomes binding on broadband 
subscribers through standardized terms of service, i.e., the law of 
contracts. 
1. The Six Strikes Protocol 
At the core of the CAS protocol is an escalating sequence of 
six warnings, or “copyright alerts,” separated by seven-day grace 
periods.156  To begin the process, a copyright owner sends a notice 
of infringement to a subscriber’s ISP, which then generates an alert 
and sends it to the subscriber whose IP address was identified in 
the notice.157  To prevent ISPs from being overwhelmed by an 
unmanageable volume of notices, the MOU requires participating 
copyright owners to allocate among themselves an unspecified (but 
presumably fixed) number of notices per month.158  In addition to 
that limit, ISPs have discretion to temporarily stop processing 
notices if the demand on their systems and resources becomes 
unreasonable.159  Any temporary stoppage must be followed, 
however, by prompt notice to copyright owners and a collaborative 
effort to correct the “over-provisioning.”160 
 
 153 See id. at 4–5. 
 154 See id. at 7.  
 155 See id.  
 156 See MOU, supra note 11, at 7.  An ISP may send additional alerts during grace 
periods, but those alerts do not count toward the total number of six. Id. at 10.  
 157 See id. at 7. 
 158 See id. at 16. 
 159 See id.  
 160 Id.  
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The first two copyright alerts are educational in nature and 
require no response or action from the subscriber.161  They explain 
that copyright infringement is illegal, that there are lawful ways of 
obtaining copyrighted content, and that users who persist in 
infringing copyrights will be subject to sanctions.162  The third and 
fourth alerts contain sterner language and require the subscriber to 
acknowledge receipt.163  The required acknowledgment can occur 
by means of either a click-through pop-up window or a click-
through landing page to which the user’s browser is diverted.164  At 
the acknowledgment stage, the subscriber must indicate that he or 
she agrees to immediately stop any infringing conduct in which he 
or she may have been engaged.165 
Sanctions, or “mitigation measures,” are not triggered until a 
fifth alert is sent.166  The MOU avoids being prescriptive when it 
comes to sanctions, specifying instead a range of mitigation 
measures from which ISPs can choose.167  Such measures include, 
but are not limited to, a temporary reduction in transmission speed, 
a temporary step-down in the subscriber’s service tier, a temporary 
redirection to a landing page for completion of a program of 
copyright instruction, a temporary redirection to a landing page 
until the subscriber contacts a customer service representative, or a 
temporary suspension of access.168  No ISP operating under the 
MOU is required to suspend access for any subscriber.169  (This 
point should be emphasized, because it upsets the common 
assumption that Internet disconnection is always the end-game in 
graduated response.)  In lieu of imposing a mitigation measure 
with the fifth alert, the ISP may elect to waive the measure and 
send a standalone fifth warning alert.170  The sixth alert, however, 
 
 161 See id. at 8–9.  An ISP may reduce the number of educational alerts from two to one, 
at its discretion. See id.  
 162 See id. at 8. 
 163 See id. at 9–10. 
 164 See id. at 10. 
 165 See id.  The subscriber also “agrees to instruct other users of the subscriber’s 
account to cease infringing conduct, if any.” Id. 
 166 Id. at 10–12 . 
 167 See id. at 11–12. 
 168 See id. 
 169 See id. at 12. 
 170 See id. 
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must be accompanied by some mitigation measure.171  The 
mitigation measure can be the same one that was applied with the 
fifth alert, assuming the sanction was not waived at that stage, or a 
different one.172  After the sixth alert has been sent, the ISP has no 
further obligation to continue sending alerts to the subscriber, but it 
is required to keep count of any additional notices received from 
copyright owners concerning that subscriber.173  At every stage, 
the system will “reset” for the subscriber if twelve months pass 
without the receipt of an additional alert.174 
2. The Appeal Process 
Before any mitigation measure is imposed, the recipient of a 
fifth or sixth alert has fourteen days to appeal the alert via a non-
judicial process outlined in the MOU.175  The appeal process, 
which the MOU calls the “Independent Review Program,” is a 
non-exclusive dispute resolution system administered by the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) under contract with 
CCI.176  Overall costs of administration are split between the 
copyright owner representative and ISP groups.177  At the 
individual case level, an appealing subscriber pays a thirty-five 
dollar filing fee, which may be waived at the discretion of AAA.178  
The filing fee is refundable if the subscriber prevails in his or her 
appeal.179  The appeal process is designed to be “automated to the 
maximum extent practicable.”180 
Each appeal is decided by a single reviewer chosen by AAA 
from a panel of neutrals.181  Reviewers must be lawyers, but they 
are not required to have the level of legal and case management 
 
 171 See id. at 12–13. 
 172 See id.  
 173 See id. at 13.  
 174 See id.   
 175 See id. at 14.  
 176 See id. at 26; Three Major Steps Press Release, supra note 141 (announcing that 
AAA will conduct the independent reviews). 
 177 See MOU, supra note 11, at 14. 
 178 See id. at 30. 
 179 See id. at 28. 
 180 Id. at 34. 
 181 See id. at 31. 
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experience that AAA arbitrators deciding other kinds of cases 
have.182  All reviewers deciding CAS appeals are trained by a 
AAA-commissioned, CCI-approved copyright expert to apply 
prevailing legal principles as determined by federal courts.183  By 
the terms of the MOU, this copyright expert must agree to receive 
input from copyright owners concerning what the prevailing legal 
principles are.184 
A subscriber initiates an appeal by completing an online form 
wherein the subscriber asserts a defense or defenses to the 
allegations in the alert.185  The MOU limits a subscriber’s grounds 
for review to exactly six: (1) account misidentification; (2) 
unauthorized use of account; (3) authorized use of content; (4) fair 
use; (5) misidentification of content; and (6) work published before 
1923.186  No other defenses are mentioned in the MOU, although a 
number of other defenses to copyright infringement claims are 
available to defendants in civil cases brought under the Copyright 
Act.187  With respect to each of the six possible grounds for review, 
the burden of proof is on the subscriber, effectively creating a 
presumption of infringement.188  That is to say, a sanction will be 
imposed unless the subscriber wins the appeal. 
In cases where the subscriber alleges account misidentification, 
two types of error can come into play: incorrect capture of a 
subscriber’s Internet protocol (IP) address and incorrect matching 
of a captured IP address to a subscriber’s account.189  The 
 
 182 See id. at 33. 
 183 See id. at 35. 
 184 See id. at 35.  
 185 See id. at 29. 
 186 See id. at 26. 
 187 See id.; 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–122 (2006) (limitations on exclusive rights). 
 188 See MOU, supra note 11, at 26–28 (explaining the standard of review for each of the 
six defenses). 
 189 An example of incorrect capture is illustrated in a 2008 study by computer science 
researchers at the University of Washington, who were able to trick P2P network 
monitors into sending notices of infringement to printers and other networked devices 
incapable of being used to share files. See MICHAEL PIATEK ET AL., CHALLENGES AND 
DIRECTIONS FOR MONITORING P2P FILE SHARING NETWORKS–OR–WHY MY PRINTER 
RECEIVED A DMCA TAKEDOWN NOTICE, Technical Report No. UW-CSE-08-06-01, 
UNIV. OF WASH. (2008), available at http://dmca.cs.washington.edu/dmca_hotsec08.pdf.  
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copyright owner or its agent is the source of the first type of error; 
the ISP is the source of the second.  With respect to address 
capture errors, copyright owners under the MOU enjoy a rebuttable 
presumption of correctness as long as their method of capturing IP 
addresses was not found to be “fundamentally unreliable” by the 
CCI’s independent technical expert.190  In cases where the 
subscriber alleges misidentification of content, copyright owners 
are likewise entitled to a rebuttable presumption of correctness as 
long as their method of identifying their copyrighted content was 
not found to be “fundamentally unreliable.”191  When it comes to 
defenses involving misidentification, any method of IP address 
capture or content identification that is not “fundamentally 
unreliable” is treated as adequate under the MOU.192 
A subscriber may invoke the defense of unauthorized use of 
account only if the unauthorized user was not a member or invitee 
of the subscriber’s household, making the subscriber ultimately 
sanctionable for any infringements that occur under his or her 
roof.193  The unauthorized use scenario for which the defense is 
intended occurs when a subscriber’s wireless router is left 
unsecured or is hacked, and strangers thereby gain access to the 
subscriber’s home network and Internet connection.194  An 
additional limit on the unauthorized use defense is that it may be 
used only once per subscriber, after which the subscriber is 
expected to secure his or her router to prevent future unauthorized 
use.195  This de facto security obligation arises whether or not the 
 
Incorrect matching can occur in cases where ISPs assign IP addresses dynamically, from 
a pool, as individual users connect to the Internet.  Over the course of time, the same IP 
address is assigned to different subscribers, creating the potential for mismatches if there 
are errors in the ISP log files that keep track of IP address assignments. Cf. Saul Hansell, 
Google Says IP Addresses Aren’t Personal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2008, 10:50 pm), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/google-says-ip-addresses-arent-personal.  
 190 MOU, supra note 11, at 5, 27.  
 191 Id. at 5, 28. 
 192 See id. at 5 (providing that a confidential “finding of inadequacy” shall be issued if 
the method of identification is found to be “fundamentally unreliable”). 
 193 See id. at 27. 
 194 See id.  
 195 See id.  The subscriber may raise the defense more than once only if s/he shows by 
clear and convincing evidence that s/he took reasonable steps to secure the account 
following the first occurrence of unauthorized use. See id.  
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subscriber has any contractual obligation to his or her ISP to secure 
his or her router.196 
In cases where the subscriber alleges authorized use of content, 
the subscriber bears the burden of producing credible written 
evidence of specific authorization by the copyright owner or 
someone authorized by the copyright owner to reproduce the file in 
question.197  A subscriber raising a defense of authorized use may 
have his or her identity disclosed to the copyright owner if such 
disclosure is necessary for the claim of authorization to be 
evaluated.198  This is the only circumstance in which a subscriber’s 
identity may ever be disclosed to a copyright owner within the 
structure of CAS.199  In all other cases, the subscriber’s identity is 
known only to the ISP and the reviewer.200 
The remaining defenses—fair use and publication before 
1923—derive from specific provisions of the Copyright Act.201  
The merits of a subscriber’s fair use defense are determined 
pursuant to prevailing legal principles as determined by CCI’s 
approved expert.202  To avoid hairsplitting over cases of de minimis 
use, copyright owners agree in the MOU to focus only on file 
transfers that involve transmission of a complete or substantially 
complete copyrighted work.203  Decisions about what constitutes a 
“substantially complete” copy of a work appear to be left to 
copyright owners.204  The final ground for appeal—that the work 
 
 196 Although copyright owners have argued that a user’s failure to secure his or her 
router constitutes actionable negligence, courts have held that there is no tort duty for 
broadband users to secure their routers. See Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. Tabora, No. 
12 Civ. 2234, 2012 WL 2711381, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2012); AF Holdings, LLC v. 
Doe, No. C 12–2049 PJH, 2012 WL 3835102, at *4 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 4, 2012) (both cases 
holding that a negligence claim for failure to secure a router used by a direct copyright 
infringer is preempted by the Copyright Act). 
 197 See MOU, supra note 11, at 27. 
 198 See id. at 29. 
 199 See id. at 14.  
 200 See id. at 29. 
 201 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (fair use); 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–304 (2006) (duration). 
 202 See MOU, supra note 11, at 35. 
 203 See id. at 6. 
 204 See LaFrance, supra note 140, at 174.  As Professor LaFrance points out, even a 
large amount of copying can fall under the rubric of fair use when, for example, the use is 
for parody. Id.  
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was published before 1923—relates to copyright’s limited duration 
(i.e., no work published before 1923 is still protected by copyright) 
and amounts to a claim that the work in question is in the public 
domain because its copyright has expired.  The burden of 
demonstrating publication before 1923 falls on the subscriber.205  
Although there are other reasons for which a work may be in the 
public domain, none of them is available as a defense in the review 
process laid out in the MOU. 
When asserting one or more of the six cognizable grounds for 
review, the subscriber must provide sufficient factual information 
to allow the reviewer to evaluate the merits of the defense(s).206  
Once an appeal has been initiated, the reviewer is also provided 
with a standard package of information concerning the subscriber’s 
contacts with CAS leading up to the appeal.207  The reviewer may 
request supplemental information from the copyright owner or the 
ISP if such information is needed to decide the appeal.208  Beyond 
requests for supplemental information, the MOU provides that 
there be no communication concerning pending appeals among the 
reviewer, the ISP, and the copyright owner.209  The entire appeal 
process is designed to be completed within ten days of the 
reviewer’s receipt of a complete file and within about thirty days 
of the initiation of the appeal.210  If the subscriber prevails, the 
copyright alert in question is invalidated.211 
IV. FIVE NORMS FOR MEASURING SIX STRIKES 
The implementation of privately designed and administered 
graduated response protocols like CAS raises a host of public 
interest concerns, five of which are the focus of this Part: freedom 
of expression, privacy, fairness, proportionality, and transparency.  
Although the same concerns are raised by publicly administered 
protocols like Hadopi, the private nature of CAS means that there 
 
 205 See MOU, supra note 11, at 6.  
 206 See id. at 29. 
 207 See id. at 31–32. 
 208 See id. at 32. 
 209 See id. at 33. 
 210 See id. at 31–35 (prescribing deadlines for successive phases of the review process). 
 211 See id. at 28. 
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will be no public forum for debate over the terms of the MOU or 
the procedures and sanctions it prescribes.  CAS was presented to 
the public as a fait accompli and will be offered for the public’s 
assent as a contract of adhesion for broadband service.  There will 
be, in other words, no bargaining about it.  Some people will be 
able to choose a non-party ISP212 and thereby avoid being subject 
to CAS, but many (if not most) will not have that option given the 
state of the market for residential broadband service and the size 
and reach of the ISPs participating in the MOU.213  CAS will be 
the law for millions of U.S. broadband subscribers, whether they 
like it or not.  As with the Eircom protocol, because there is no 
state action involved, there will be no judicial review of the 
constitutionality of the MOU’s provisions.  The CCI advisory 
board, whose members were not even appointed until after 
negotiations over the substance of CAS were closed, is the public’s 
only advocate within the CAS governance structure, yet it had no 
role in the design of the protocol and is not empowered to make 
recommendations about implementation that bind the CCI 
executive committee.  What follows is a public interest assessment 
of CAS, which reveals that the protocol is a mixed bag for 
broadband users. 
A. Freedom of Expression 
The two most significant threats to freedom of expression in 
online copyright enforcement are suspension of Internet access, 
which is the typical endpoint of graduated response protocols, and 
content filtering, which ISPs can do using deep packet inspection 
(DPI) technology already deployed within their networks for traffic 
management and other purposes.214 
 
 212 Cox, Qwest, RCN, CableOne, Charter, and Mediacom, for example, are not parties 
to the MOU. 
 213 In 2010, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) reported that 96% of the 
U.S. population had at most two wireline broadband providers from which to choose. See 
FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 37 (2010).  To unpack 
that statistic, approximately 4% of households were served by three providers, 78% were 
served by two, 13% were served by one, and 5% had no access to wireline broadband. Id. 
 214 See Bridy, Graduated Response, supra note 19, at 104–05 (discussing the various 
uses of deep packet inspection).  
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1. Suspension of Access 
Of the two threats, suspension of access, which can be either 
across-the-board or service-selective, is the more extreme.  Across-
the-board suspension of access forecloses all online 
communication for affected subscribers and their households for 
the duration of the suspension.  For subscribers who bundle 
broadband Internet access and VOIP telephony into one package, 
across-the-board suspension of access entails the loss of phone 
service in addition to the loss of Web access and Web-reliant 
applications like media streaming and video conferencing.  In 
contrast, a service-specific suspension of access might block 
access to the World Wide Web but leave other services, including 
telephony and e-mail, unaffected.  The extent to which a 
suspension of access impinges on expressive freedoms will vary 
with the duration of the suspension and the range of affected 
services: the longer and more comprehensive the suspension, 
obviously, the greater its impact. 
Both types of suspension impact expressive freedoms beyond 
freedom of speech, including freedom of association, freedom to 
receive information, and freedom to engage in commercial 
transactions.215  In a world that depends increasingly on the 
Internet for all kinds of meaningful social, cultural, political, and 
commercial activity, suspension of access is a sanction laden with 
consequences that reach far beyond the consumption of 
copyrighted content and the ability to swap files over P2P 
networks.216 
The MOU permits but does not require participating ISPs to 
suspend access for subscribers reaching the fifth or sixth copyright 
alert.217  As discussed above in Part III.B, temporary suspension of 
access is one among many mitigation measures from which ISPs 
can choose in order to comply with their obligation to sanction.  
Permanent disconnection is not contemplated at all, and ISPs retain 
the right under the MOU to be service-selective in their 
 
 215 See Bridy, Graduated Response, supra note 19, at 126. 
 216 See id.  
 217 See MOU, supra note 11, at 11 (listing “temporary restriction of the Subscriber’s 
Internet access for some reasonable period of time” among possible mitigation measures). 
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suspensions, excluding services like telephony, e-mail, and multi-
channel video programming.218  Given the menu of lesser measures 
available and the draconian flavor of suspension of access, it 
would be surprising to see ISPs voluntarily taking that route under 
CAS, even in a service-selective and time-limited way.  To attract 
and retain customers, participating ISPs have an incentive to 
gravitate toward the more moderate, user-friendly sanctions 
enumerated in the MOU (e.g., “copyright school,” customer 
service contact, or temporary speed or service tier reductions), 
which they will almost certainly do.  This prediction jibes with a 
public statement from CCI’s director, Jill Lesser, who said in an 
interview that termination is not an anticipated sanction because 
the ultimate aim of CAS is educational and not punitive.219 
2. Content Filtering 
The second major threat to expressive freedom in graduated 
response regimes is in-network filtering of infringing content.  
During the legislative process that led to the creation of Hadopi in 
France, corporate copyright owners pushed hard for a filtering 
mandate, but their efforts failed, in large part over concerns about 
compromising expressive rights guaranteed in the European 
Convention on Human Rights.220  On this side of the Atlantic, 
filtering has been an open topic of conversation between corporate 
copyright owners and ISPs since at least 2008, but the major ISPs 
have so far declined to do it, citing the need for improvements in 
the technology and the need to find a consumer friendly 
approach.221 
 
 218 See id. at 12. 
 219 See Sarah Lai Stirland, The Center For Copyright Information’s New Chief Jill 
Lesser On Top ISPs’ New “Copyright Alert” System, TECHPRESIDENT (Apr. 5, 2012), 
http://techpresident.com/news/22016/interview-center-copyright-informations-new-chief-
jill-lesser (interviewing Jill Lesser).  
 220 See HORTEN, supra note 33, at 49–51 (discussing the right to freedom of expression 
under European law); id. at 89 (quoting from copyright industry submissions to EU 
governmental entities in support of a filtering mandate for ISPs). 
 221 See Brad Stone, AT&T and Other I.S.P.’s May Be Getting Ready to Filter, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 8, 2008, 7:07 pm), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/08/att-and-other-
isps-may-be-getting-ready-to-filter (reporting on the subject matter of a panel discussion 
on digital piracy at the 2008 Consumer Electronics Show). 
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Filtering threatens freedom of expression because of the 
potential for over-blocking, which has not been (and possibly may 
never be) reliably eliminated through improvements in technology.  
Copyright infringing speech is not protected under the First 
Amendment,222 but separating it from protected speech as it whips 
through cyberspace in tiny packets is a very tall order.  Even when 
methods for identifying unauthorized files in transit are highly 
accurate, the computer algorithms on which those methods rely are 
ill-suited to determining whether any particular unauthorized 
transfer is protected by the doctrine of fair use.223  Whereas the fair 
use analysis is subtle, contextual, and standards-based, software 
engines for filtering are rule-based, and the tension between the 
two persists even as the state of the art advances.224  Filtering 
technology may thus never be equal to the task of separating 
infringing uses from fair ones, and the inevitable consequence of 
that failure will be blocking of lawful speech.  Corporate copyright 
owners, who view traffic-filtering and site-blocking as preferred 
solutions, tend to discount the risk of over-blocking.225  Judges and 
 
 222 See, e.g., Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004).  
 223 See Sonia K. Katyal & Jason M. Schultz, The Unending Search for the Optimal 
Infringement Filter, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 83, 99–101 (2012) (arguing that 
automated filters are not equal to the task of identifying infringing works and assessing 
fair use). 
 224 The critique of automated copyright enforcement first arose in debates in the late 
1990s over digital rights management (DRM) software and statutory prohibitions on its 
circumvention. See, e.g., Dan Burk & Julie Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights 
Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41 (2001); Edward W. Felten, A Skeptical 
View of DRM and Fair Use, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 57; James Grimmelmann, 
Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1752–53 (2005). 
In more recent years, the same (still compelling) critique has been leveled against the use 
of filtering technology to block access to infringing content. See Mehan Jayasuriya et al., 
Forcing the Net Through a Sieve: Why Copyright Filtering is Not a Solution for U.S. 
ISPs, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE 1, 4–5, 47–52, http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pk-
filtering-whitepaper-200907.pdf (arguing that no technology can ensure that fair use 
rights will be protected).  
 225 See IFPI, supra note 17, at 22 (praising the South Korean government for requiring 
ISPs to block user access to websites, including P2P trackers).  Much of the public 
relations material released by proponents of website blocking evades the issue of over-
blocking and simply invokes the premise that infringing speech is not constitutionally 
protected. See Rep. Lamar Smith, Myth v. Fact: Stop Online Piracy Act, U.S. House of 
Representatives Judiciary Comm., available at http://judiciary.house.gov/issues/Rogue% 
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members of the public, however, are less blasé.  In the policy 
debates over the Stop Online Piracy Act and the PROTECT IP Act, 
both of which required ISPs to block users’ access to “foreign 
infringing sites,” millions of Americans made it clear to Congress 
that protected speech should not be regarded as tolerable collateral 
damage in the war on piracy.226  Across the Atlantic, the ECJ ruled 
in 2011 in Scarlet v. SABAM that a Belgian national court could 
not, as a matter of EU law, issue an injunction that would require 
an ISP to install and maintain a system for filtering P2P file 
transfers.227  Such a system, the court said, would violate EU 
protections for freedom of information, because it could not be 
relied upon to distinguish adequately between lawful and unlawful 
file transfers.228 
CAS does not entail any blocking or filtering of content, so the 
threat to freedom of expression associated with over-blocking is 
not an issue for broadband subscribers whose ISPs are parties to 
the MOU.  In the CAS protocol, copyright owners identify files as 
infringing and report the alleged infringements to ISPs, but neither 
the copyright owner nor the ISP takes any action to block file 
transfers as they are occurring.  To avoid issuing notices in 
response to de minimis or protected uses of copyrighted works, 
copyright owners agree in the MOU to focus only on file transfers 
consisting of copyrighted works in complete or substantially 
complete form.  This is a commendable if imprecise effort to 
accommodate fair use by treating transfers of partial copies as non-
events.229  On the whole, then, CAS should not be a major cause of 
 
20Websites/011812_SOPA%20Myth%20vs%20Fact.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) 
(asserting without qualification that the website blocking provision in the Stop Online 
Piracy Act implicates no speech protected by the First Amendment). 
 226 See Annemarie Bridy, Copyright Policymaking as Procedural Democratic Process: 
A Discourse-Theoretic Prespective on ACTA, SOPA, and PIPA, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 153, 159 (2012) (detailing the public outcry in response to SOPA and PIPA).  
 227 Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et 
Ėditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 2011 ¶¶ 52–54, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/ 
document.jsf?text=&docid=115202&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=
first&part=1&cid=5311.  
 228 See id. at ¶ 52. 
 229 The amount of the copyrighted work borrowed and the extent to which the 
borrowing creates a market substitute for the copyrighted work are factors in the fair use 
analysis, which means that complete or substantially complete copies of copyrighted 
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concern for consumers when it comes to the protection of 
expressive freedoms, because content filtering is not a component 
of the protocol, partial copies are not noticed, and suspensions of 
Internet access are unlikely given the availability to ISPs of more 
palatable sanctions. 
B. Privacy 
Graduated response systems involve surveillance of Internet 
traffic for infringing file transfers, and they require ISPs to put 
names to the otherwise anonymous IP addresses associated with 
those transfers.  Both of these features raise privacy concerns, and 
both have been found by the European Data Protection Supervisor 
to violate the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and EU Data 
Protection and Privacy Directives.230  Comparatively speaking, 
however, the legal climate for these activities in the United States 
is more hospitable than it is in the European Union.  This is true 
for at least two reasons: First, the U.S. government has not taken a 
coherent approach to privacy regulation in the digital environment, 
opting instead for a hodgepodge of sector-specific legislation and 
permissive industry norms for online monitoring and data 
collection.231  Second, corporate copyright owners have been very 
successful at convincing courts and legislators that the right to go 
incognito online should not shield alleged infringers from 
liability.232 
 
works are much more likely than partial copies to be infringing. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(2006) (setting forth the fair use factors).  The focus on substantially complete copies will 
likely lead to some degree of under-identification of infringing file transfers. 
 230 See id. ¶ 84.  The finding, however, has not caused France to alter the Hadopi 
protocol, nor has it had any impact on the Irish High Court’s analysis of privacy issues 
relating to Eircom’s protocol in Ireland. 
 231 See generally CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, EUROPEAN COMM’N DIRECTORATE-GENERAL 
JUSTICE, FREEDOM AND SEC., COMPARATIVE STUDY ON DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO NEW 
PRIVACY CHALLENGES, IN PARTICULAR IN THE LIGHT OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS— 
COUNTRY STUDIES: UNITED STATES (2010) (providing an overview of data and privacy 
protections in the United States at federal and state levels), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1639161.  It should not surprise us 
that privacy policy is in disarray, because, as Daniel Solove has observed, privacy as a 
concept is also in disarray. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1 (2008). 
 232 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006) (providing that copyright owners may obtain and 
serve subpoenas on ISPs to identify subscribers who allegedly infringe copyrights by 
uploading files to servers maintained by the ISPs); Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1-40, 
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1. Surveillance 
Surveillance for copyright enforcement is at its most invasive 
when it is hardwired within an ISP’s network.  ISPs can install 
dedicated devices that use DPI to detect and block file transfers 
identified as (or as likely to be) infringing.233  Blocking can be 
done crudely on a protocol-specific basis—e.g., blocking all 
BitTorrent traffic—or more granularly by matching digital 
fingerprints, file hashes, or other unique identifiers associated with 
transiting files against a database maintained by the ISP or a third 
party provider.234  ISP-based surveillance requires that all traffic 
for all customers be scrutinized all the time, creating an 
environment of pervasive and invisible surveillance.  James Boyle 
described this phenomenon in 1997, citing Michel Foucault’s work 
on sovereign power and penal systems, as the “privatization of the 
Panopticon.”235  More recently, Derek Bambauer cast it in 
Orwellian terms.236  When Boyle was writing, the architecture was 
willing, but the technology was weak.  Whereas ISPs have always 
controlled the point on the network through which every bit of 
information a user sends and receives must pass, they have not 
always enjoyed the ability to probe, mine, and sort that information 
 
326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying a motion to quash plaintiff’s 
subpoena to Cablevision demanding the identities of defendants, alleged P2P infringers, 
based on their IP addresses). 
 233 One example of such a device is AudibleMagic’s CopySense appliance, which is 
marketed widely to colleges and universities for use in managing P2P file sharing on their 
networks. Technology Overview, AUDIBLE MAGIC, http://audiblemagic.com/ 
technology.php  (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).  Another is Blue Coat’s PacketShaper, an 
enterprise appliance for which marketing materials boast “the x-ray vision needed to 
monitor today’s network traffic.” PacketShaper, BLUE COAT, https://www.bluecoat.com/ 
products/packetshaper (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
 234 See KLAUS MOCHALSKI ET AL., IPOQUE, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION IN THE INTERNET 
(2009), available at http://www.ipoque.com/sites/default/files/mediafiles/documents/ 
white-paper-copyright-protection-internet.pdf (explaining different mechanisms for 
blocking and filtering infringing traffic, including ones that operate at the host or 
application level—e.g., DNS blocking, protocol blacklisting, port blocking—and ones 
that operate at the file level—e.g., fingerprinting, hash-based identification, and 
watermarking).  
 235 See James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberpsace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and 
Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 197, 198 (1997). 
 236 See Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863 (2012). 
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for a dozen different ends—including copyright enforcement.237  
They do now, though, thanks to DPI. 
Privacy scholars have questioned whether ISPs’ use of DPI 
violates the Wiretap Act.238  Despite its questionable legality, 
however, DPI has become standard operating procedure for ISPs 
for such purposes as congestion management and spam- and virus-
filtering.239  Although the technology has been adopted by several 
colleges and universities in an effort to curb illegal file sharing on 
campus networks, major ISPs have not warmed to the idea of using 
DPI for copyright enforcement.240  The fact that DPI can be quite 
easily defeated by encryption has not helped copyright owners 
make the case for it to ISPs, which also have other reasons to be 
reluctant.241  The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
sanctioned Comcast in 2008 for its use of DPI to manage 
 
 237 See generally Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1423–24, 1436 (2009) (discussing the unique position ISPs occupy in 
the economy of Internet surveillance). 
 238 Paul Ohm concludes that the use of DPI, particularly by the backbone providers that 
serve ISPs rather than retail customers, most likely violates the Wiretap Act. See id. at 
1486.  He discusses the possibility that retail ISPs could be covered by the consent 
exception to the ECPA, based on their terms of service, but he points out that applicable 
state wiretapping laws might require two-party consent, which cannot be secured through 
terms of service that bind only one of the parties involved in any given online 
communication. See id.  
 239 Sandvine, a Canadian provider of DPI hardware to ISPs worldwide, reported in 2009 
that 90% of its 160 customers were using the technology to manage traffic on their 
networks. See Nate Anderson, DPI Vendor Says 90% of ISP Customers Engage in Traffic 
Discrimination, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 3, 2009), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/ 
2009/08/network-neutrality-dead-in-practice-as-most-isps-throttle.ars. 
 240 See Bridy, Graduated Response, supra note 19, at 84, 123 (discussing the use of DPI 
in higher education IT network management); Milton Mueller et al., Policing the 
Network: Using DPI for Copyright Enforcement, 9 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 348, 361 
(2012) (stating that although ISPs have varied in the intensity of their opposition to using 
DPI for copyright enforcement, there is no evidence that any has actively embraced or 
advocated it). 
 241 See Bridy, Graduated Response, supra note 19, at 120–24 (discussing a 2009 district 
court case holding that a Usenet host engaged in active network management is not 
entitled to invoke copyright law’s protections for “mere conduits”); Rob Frieden, Internet 
Packet Sniffing and its Impact on the Network Neutrality Debate and the Balance of 
Power Between Intellectual Property Creators and Consumers, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 633, 645 (2008) (asserting that ISPs’ use of DPI raises 
questions about their continued eligibility for safe harbor under section 512 of the 
DMCA). 
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congestion by blocking BitTorrent P2P transfers, but the sanction 
was later invalidated in a decision by the Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit, which held that the FCC lacked statutory authority to 
impose the sanction.242  Net neutrality regulations promulgated by 
the FCC following the Comcast sanction, and currently under 
review in the D.C. Circuit, do not prohibit ISPs from intervening at 
the network level to enforce copyrights, so long as the efforts 
undertaken are reasonable.243  Although those regulations will 
likely not survive judicial review, the exception they make for 
copyright enforcement highlights the extent to which the U.S. 
government has sought to clear the way for increased ISP 
cooperation with copyright owners and the extent to which 
copyright concerns have fully infiltrated the debate over net 
neutrality. 
A less intrusive and more common type of surveillance 
associated with graduated response is one in which copyright 
owners hire third party agents to monitor public P2P file sharing 
networks by joining them and documenting IP addresses that 
appear to be sharing infringing files.244  ISPs play no role in this 
type of self-help monitoring, which is sometimes referred to as 
 
 242 See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that 
the FCC lacks statutory authority to regulate the network management practices of 
broadband providers).  Comcast was not using DPI for copyright enforcement purposes. 
Id. at 645.  
 243 See 47 C.F.R. § 8.9 (2011) (“Nothing in this part prohibits reasonable efforts by a 
provider of broadband Internet access service to address copyright infringement or other 
unlawful activity.”); In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 
(Federal Communications Commission) (2010) (FCC issues a final order establishing net 
neutrality rules); Brief for Appellant at 2, Verizon v. FCC, No. 11-1355, (D.C. Cir. 
2012), 2012 WL 2561139 (seeking to invalidate net neutrality rules issued by the FCC in 
2010). 
 244 MarkMonitor, which acquired industry leader DtecNet in 2010, is now probably the 
largest provider in this space, but other firms, such as Peer Media Technologies, also 
offer P2P monitoring services. See, e.g., Josh Halliday, Copyright Tracking Firm DtecNet 
In Multinational Buyout, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 18, 2012, 6:29 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/blog/2010/oct/18/copyright-dtecnet-markmonitor 
(describing DtechNet’s market share at the time of acquisition); Robin Wauters, 
MarkMonitor Acquires DTecNet to Combat Online Piracy, TECH CRUNCH (Oct. 18, 
2010), http:// techcrunch.com/2010/10/18/markmonitor-dtecnet (stating that 
MarkMonitor bought DtecNet, a global antipiracy company); Notification Services, PEER 
MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES, http://peermediatech.com/notification.html (last visited Nov. 16, 
2012) (describing P2P and cyberlocker monitoring services). 
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“over-the-top” (OTT) surveillance because it operates at the 
Internet’s application layer and not at the level of physical 
infrastructure.245  The field of OTT surveillance is limited to 
publicly accessible P2P networks, and the monitors can be detected 
and avoided based on their behavior—albeit not by the average 
user.246  OTT surveillance provides the evidentiary basis for 
sanctions in the French and Irish implementations of graduated 
response, and corporate rights owners in the U.S. have relied on it 
since the early 2000s, when they began monitoring P2P networks 
in conjunction with their litigation campaign against individual file 
sharers.247  Given the publicity surrounding that campaign, 
informed users of public P2P networks know by now that they are 
not sharing files in an unmonitored environment.248 
Under the MOU, copyright owners take the OTT approach to 
monitoring, which is significantly less invasive of user privacy 
than DPI-based surveillance.249  While Trisha Meyer and Leo Van 
Audenhove have argued rightly that graduated response 
contributes to the normalization of surveillance on the Internet,250 
 
 245 See Mueller et al., supra note 240, at 361 (using the term).  By way of further 
explanation, P2P networks are classified as “overlay networks” because they run at the 
application layer, on top of the underlying physical structure of the Internet. See Enrico 
Marocco et al., Peer-to-Peer Infrastructure: A Survey of Research on the Application-
Layer Traffic Optimization Problem and the Need for Layer Cooperation, IEEE 
COMMC’NS MAGAZINE, Aug. 2009, at 107, 107 (explaining that P2P applications 
“discover a route to each other through an overlay network with little knowledge of the 
underlying network topology”). 
 246 See, e.g., Anirban Banerjee et al., The P2P War: Someone Is Monitoring Your 
Activities!, 52 J. COMPUTER NETWORKS 1272, 1272–73 (2008) (explaining how to 
identify and avoid the “fake users” employed by the RIAA and the MPAA on P2P 
networks). 
 247 See Annemarie Bridy, Why Pirates (Still) Won’t Behave: Regulating P2P in the 
Decade After Napster, 40 RUTGERS L. J. 565, 590–96 (2009) [hereinafter Bridy, Pirates] 
(discussing the surveillance program on which the RIAA’s litigation campaign relied to 
produce evidence of P2P infringements). 
 248 See, e.g., About Copyright Notices, RIAA, https://www.riaa.com/toolsfor 
parents.php?content_selector=resources-music-copyright-notices (last visited Nov. 16, 
2012) (emphasizing that P2P file sharers are not anonymous). 
 249 See Mueller et al., supra note 240, at 360 (pointing out that the MOU relies on OTT 
methods for surveillance rather than on DPI).  
 250 See Trisha Meyer & Leo Van Audenhove, Surveillance and Regulating Code: An 
Analysis of Graduated Response in France, 9 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 365, 375 (2012) 
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not all methods of online surveillance are equally intrusive, and 
they should not be treated as such.  Not only is the field of 
surveillance much narrower in OTT monitoring, the activity in 
question takes place in plain view of anyone who cares to join the 
network.251  Publicly accessible P2P networks operate by making 
the contents of every connected storage device searchable and 
accessible to other devices on the network.  No participant can 
reasonably expect the contents of his or her hard drive to remain 
private when he or she is broadcasting (and offering to share) them 
on the open Internet.252  Users who want to engage in unmonitored 
P2P transactions can do so via password-secured networks or 
virtual private networks (VPNs), and OTT monitoring by 
copyright owners has almost certainly driven a percentage of P2P 
traffic underground.253  If copyright owners were to attempt to 
monitor online activity in such secured environments, the threat to 
privacy would be more real.  But given the open nature of the 
networks in question, copyright owners are not breaching the 
privacy of participants by capturing the IP addresses associated 
with potentially infringing file transfers.254 
One privacy impact of CAS that follows from OTT 
surveillance is ISP retention and reporting of information about the 
alleged infringements of subscribers.  Under the MOU, ISPs track 
and report the notices they receive and the alerts they send to every 
 
(arguing that “graduated response . . . allows the move towards a permanent surveillance 
of citizens’ conduct on the Internet”). 
 251 As the Irish High Court noted in EMI v. UPC, “DtecNet does what any user of a 
peer-to-peer network does in order to obtain a download.  No extra information is 
obtained.” EMI v. UPC, [2010] IEHC 377, ¶ 34 (H. Ct.) (Ir.). 
 252 In one study, 100% of peers participating in observed P2P networks over a ninety-
day period between January and March 2006 made contact with one or more fake users. 
See Banerjee et al., supra note 246, at 1272. 
 253 TorrentFreak, a site dedicated to P2P file sharing, has rated VPN providers based on 
the degree to which they protect user anonymity in the face of third party requests for 
identifying information. See Which VPN Providers Really Take Anonymity Seriously?, 
TORRENTFREAK (Oct. 7, 2011), http://torrentfreak.com/which-vpn-providers-really-take-
anonymity-seriously-111007 (discussing the results of the survey). 
 254 The Irish High Court reached the same conclusion when it invalidated the Data 
Protection Commissioner’s cease and desist order against Eircom. See EMI Records v. 
Data Protection Comm’r, [2012] IEHC 264, ¶ 7.2 (H. Ct.) (Ir.) (describing participation 
in a BitTorrent swarm as “an open communication with all comers on the [I]nternet” and 
concluding that monitoring of such activity cannot be fairly equated with wiretapping).  
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subscriber, even after the CAS protocol has run its course for 
subscribers who are repeat recipients.255  ISPs send this 
information monthly in anonymized form to copyright owners, 
who may use it in litigation to seek subpoenas to identify 
subscribers and to support claims of infringement.256  Such 
information is not retained forever, though.  Retention is limited by 
the “reset” provision in the MOU, which permits ISPs to expunge 
all prior notices and alerts from a subscriber’s account if the 
subscriber goes twelve months without receiving an additional 
alert.257  To assure protection of consumer privacy, expungement 
on reset should be mandatory rather than permissive. 
2. Loss of Anonymity 
Knowing the IP address of a file sharer, which copyright 
owners can by means of OTT monitoring, is not the same as 
knowing the identity of the person who owns the account to which 
that IP address corresponds.  Matching a publicly visible IP 
address to the not-publicly-visible identity of a particular account 
holder raises a distinct privacy concern, albeit one with which U.S. 
courts have already grappled in the context of online file sharing.  
Such cases have consistently held that a person’s right to 
anonymity is outweighed by a copyright owner’s interest in good 
faith enforcement.258  Case law developed during the RIAA’s now-
abandoned campaign of litigation against individual file sharers 
permits copyright owners to obtain the identities of alleged P2P 
infringers by naming them as John Doe defendants in lawsuits and 
 
 255 See MOU, supra note 111, at 13 (providing that the ISP may stop sending alerts 
after the sixth one but must “continue to track and report the number of ISP Notices the 
Participating ISP receives for that Subscriber’s account, so that information is available 
to a Content Owner Representative if it elects to initiate a copyright infringement action 
against that Subscriber”). 
 256 See id. at 15 (“[T]he Content Owner Representatives . . . may use such reports or 
data as the basis for seeking a Subscriber’s identity through a subpoena or order or other 
lawful process.”). 
 257 See id. at 13. 
 258 See, e.g., Virgin Records Am., Inc. v. Doe, No. 5:08-CV-389-D, 2009 WL 700207, 
at *2 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 16, 2009) (denying defendant’s motion to quash plaintiff’s 
subpoena to defendant’s ISP on the ground that the First Amendment protects anonymous 
speech but not anonymous copyright infringing speech). 
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then issuing subpoenas to their ISPs.259  The match can thus be 
made by the ISP and disclosed to the complaining copyright 
owner, albeit not outside litigation and the due process that it 
affords.260 
With respect to the preservation of anonymity, the notice 
system at the core of graduated response does not require 
disclosure of subscribers’ identifying information to copyright 
owners.  This is a significant virtue of the model, which interposes 
the ISP between the subscriber and the copyright owner, thereby 
shielding the subscriber’s identity.  Non-disclosure is the rule in 
the French and Irish implementations described in Part II above, 
and it is also the rule in CAS, with one exception: an ISP is 
required under CAS to disclose the identity of a subscriber who 
raises the defense of authorization in an independent review 
proceeding, if such disclosure is necessary for the copyright owner 
to assess the validity of the defense.261  The exception is narrowly 
defined and leaves it to the reviewer rather than the copyright 
owner to decide whether disclosure is necessary in a given case.262 
All in all, CAS should not be especially worrisome for 
broadband subscribers with respect to privacy.  It does involve 
surveillance of online activity, but the monitoring it incorporates is 
publicized for deterrence purposes, limited to open P2P networks, 
and carried out horizontally by peers rather than vertically by all-
seeing intermediaries.  OTT monitoring is much less 
 
 259 See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Does, 64 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 305, *1 (N.D. Cal. 
2006) (granting the plaintiff copyright owner’s motion for expedited discovery in the 
form of a Rule 45 subpoena requiring an ISP to identify an alleged infringer). 
 260 The DMCA provides a more streamlined procedure for identifying alleged infringers 
when the infringement results from a user’s unauthorized storage of copyrighted material 
on the server of a web site operator or ISP. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2006) (setting forth 
procedures for a copyright owner to follow to obtain a pre-litigation subpoena to identify 
an alleged infringer).  That streamlined procedure, which does not require filing a 
lawsuit, has been held by courts not to apply in cases involving P2P file sharing, for 
which the technology did not exist when the DMCA was enacted. See RIAA v. Verizon 
Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  
 261 See MOU, supra note 11, at 32 (providing for disclosure of the Subscriber’s identity 
in a case involving the defense of authorization “unless the Reviewer concludes that the 
Copyright Owner does not need to know the identity of the Subscriber to evaluate the 
Subscriber’s claim that his or her activity was authorized”).  
 262 See id. at 32. 
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comprehensive and surreptitious than ISP-based surveillance, 
which would be a truly objectionable development in the evolution 
of online copyright enforcement.  Moreover, CAS does not require 
disclosure of subscriber identities to copyright owners, except in 
very limited circumstances.  In that respect, CAS is more 
protective of privacy than is mass John Doe litigation, the more 
cumbersome enforcement model that it supplants.263  Finally, CAS 
does involve retention and reporting of information about the 
alleged infringements of individual subscribers, but the “reset” 
function in the protocol serves as an important check on the size of 
that data pool. 
 
C. Fairness 
Concerns about procedural and substantive fairness in 
graduated response protocols are front and center in the growing 
body of academic literature on this subject.264  In France, such 
concerns led the Constitutional Council to reject the Hadopi 
legislation in its initial form and to require judicial review of all 
disconnection decisions.265  Because the MOU sets the goal of 
automating the individual components of CAS to the maximum 
extent practicable, the design of the system must be closely 
scrutinized to ensure that fairness does not fall victim to efficiency.  
This section focuses on four specific elements of fairness: 
presumption of innocence; opportunity for neutral adjudication; 
predictable application of established legal standards; and 
availability of defenses. 
 
 263 See Bridy, supra note 3, at 720–25 (arguing that John Doe litigation is a 
“dysfunctional workaround” for the DMCA’s failure to scale for P2P file sharing).  
 264 See Bridy, supra note 3, at 736 (asserting that graduated response systems must be 
designed to honor the competing values of efficiency and fairness); LaFrance, supra note 
140, at 175 (finding that CAS “comes up short in several respects” when viewed through 
the lens of fairness); Nicolas Suzor & Brian Fitzgerald, The Legitimacy of Graduated 
Response Schemes in Copyright Law, 34 UNIV. OF NEW S. WALES L.J. 1, 24 (2011) 
(asserting that certain minimum standards of due process must be upheld in 
implementations of graduated response); Yu, supra note 18, at 1419–20 (arguing that a 
graduated response system must respect the rule of law and the norms of fairness and 
legitimacy).  
 265 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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1. Presumption of Innocence 
In civil suits for copyright infringement, the burden of proof is 
on the plaintiff, who must prove both ownership of a valid 
copyright and infringement of an exclusive right granted by section 
106 of the Copyright Act.266  CAS alters this allocation of burdens 
by making it the responsibility of the accused (i.e., the recipient of 
a fifth or sixth copyright alert) to raise and prove a defense to 
infringement in order to avoid a sanction.267  In addition to shifting 
the burden of proof with respect to infringement, the MOU creates 
a presumption of accuracy in favor of the copyright owner, as 
discussed above in Part III.B, with respect to both the capture of IP 
addresses and the identification of copyrighted content.268  The 
presumptions of accuracy attach under the MOU as long as the 
copyright owners’ methods of collection and identification have 
not been found “fundamentally unreliable” by a technical expert.269  
On the strength of these presumptions, notices from the 
complaining copyright owner are treated as proof of infringement 
sufficient to trigger the imposition of a sanction.270  Such treatment 
was criticized in Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, a case interpreting 
the repeat infringer provision of the DMCA.271 
The allocation of burdens built into CAS is troubling because it 
conflicts with a basic principle underlying our justice system—that 
a person accused of having engaged in illegal conduct is presumed 
innocent until proven otherwise.  In keeping with that principle, 
Peter Yu has called for a focus in graduated response on proven 
infringers as opposed to alleged infringers.272  As I have argued 
 
 266 A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 267 See MOU, supra note 11, at 27–28 (setting forth the technical requirements of 
CAS). 
 268 See id.  
 269 See id.  
 270 See id. at 28. 
 271 See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108–09 (W.D. Wash. 
2004) (stating that notices from a copyright owner can bring a potential infringement to a 
provider’s attention but are not in themselves evidence of infringement, because they 
could be erroneous). But see Perfect 10 v. CCBill LLC, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1088 (C.D. 
Cal. 2004) (concluding that a provider who receives repeat notices of infringement from a 
copyright owner but does not terminate the account of the subscriber in question has not 
reasonably implemented a repeat infringer policy for purposes of the DMCA). 
 272 See Yu, supra note 18, at 1418 (emphasis in original). 
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elsewhere, however, litigation doesn’t scale well for enforcing 
copyrights against P2P file sharers.273  Graduated response is 
effective as an enforcement strategy only if it can function most of 
the time as a litigation substitute, and not as a litigation 
supplement.  That having been said, the MOU does more than it 
should to ease evidentiary burdens on copyright owners.  In 
addition to relieving them of the customary burden of having to 
prove their allegations before a sanction is imposed, it affords them 
rebuttable presumptions of evidentiary accuracy as long as their 
technical methods are not fundamentally unreliable.  Allocating the 
burden of proof on infringement to the accused is a significant 
compromise of fair process.  Adding to that compromise the 
presumption that the evidence offered against the accused is valid 
unless it was collected in a grossly negligent way is a bridge too 
far.  Given that CAS treats accumulated notices of infringement as 
sufficient evidence to justify a sanction (or to require the accused 
to prove a defense in order to avoid the sanction),274 the methods 
of address collection and content identification that underlie 
notices of infringement should be held to a much higher technical 
standard.  Copyright owners should be required by the MOU to 
adopt technical means of collecting IP addresses and identifying 
content that are affirmatively and demonstrably reliable.  
Moreover, the accuracy of those methods should be verifiable by 
independent experts who do not work as consultants for CCI and 
who are not bound by nondisclosure agreements. 
2. Opportunity for Neutral Adjudication 
Another aspect of procedural fairness is the opportunity to be 
heard by a neutral third party before any deprivation of rights or 
property occurs.  As discussed above, CAS diverges from litigation 
procedure by presuming the accuracy of the allegations contained 
in copyright alerts and shifting the burden onto the recipient to 
show that s/he is not a repeat infringer.  While CAS does not 
provide a hearing on the merits of each alert before it is issued, it 
does provide an independent review procedure, as described above 
in Part III.B, for any subscriber who wants to contest the accuracy 
 
 273 See Bridy, supra note 3, at 719–25. 
 274 See id.  
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or validity of one or more alerts after the fact.  The imposition of a 
mitigation measure is stayed pending the outcome of review.275  
The timing of the opportunity to contest allegations under CAS is 
later than optimal, but the fact that the opportunity comes before 
any sanction is imposed preserves an important element of 
fairness. 
The review focuses entirely on a spare written record—the 
“standard package”—documenting both the alleged infringements 
and the subscriber’s assertion of one or more defenses, along with 
supporting facts.276  In keeping with the efficiency imperative, 
there are no hearings, and there is no discovery.277  The austerity of 
that rule is tempered, however, by the provision in the MOU that 
enables the reviewer to seek additional information, if needed, 
from one or more of the parties.278  And the subscriber’s right to 
elect a traditional judicial forum, where hearings and discovery are 
the rule, is not foreclosed.279 
As far as the neutrality of the reviewers is concerned, CAS 
improves on the Eircom model by requiring third party 
adjudication, but it does not go as far as Hadopi, which requires a 
court order for the imposition of a sanction.  The reviewers who 
decide CAS subscriber appeals are structurally independent, 
having no employment relationship with copyright owners, ISPs, 
or CCI.  Such independence enables but does not guarantee their 
impartiality.280  As with any arbitral scheme arising from a mass 
contract of adhesion, there is in CAS the potential for anti-
consumer bias associated with the repeat-player effect.281  The 
 
 275 See MOU, supra note 11, at 30. 
 276 See id. at 31 (specifying the contents of the Application to Commence Independent 
Review (ACIR) package). 
 277 See id. at 33. 
 278 See id. at 32. 
 279 See id. at 26 (stating that the independent review process is “just one avenue of 
appeal” and that it “does not prevent [the parties] from addressing [their] disputes 
through the courts”). 
 280 Cf. Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485 (1997) 
(analyzing structural factors that tend to undermine impartiality in private arbitrations). 
 281 See id. at 524 (asserting that an arbitrator’s incentive to secure future business from 
a repeat customer is corrosive of impartiality).  Professor LaFrance has questioned 
whether the CAS independent review process will inevitably suffer from the problem of 
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reviewers work for AAA, which works for CCI, which at the end 
of the day is an entity formed for the benefit of copyright owners.  
Again, though, participation in the independent review program 
created by the MOU is not mandatory; subscribers accused of 
infringement remain free to challenge the allegations against them 
in court, presumably through an action for declaratory judgment of 
non-infringement.  The subscriber’s ability to opt out distinguishes 
the independent review program—for the better—from the 
mandatory arbitration schemes to which a wide range of consumer 
disputes arising under mass contracts are now subject in the United 
States.282  Weighing the expense of litigation and the attendant risk 
of statutory damages against the moderate sanctions outlined in the 
MOU, very few subscribers are likely to choose litigation.283  
Notwithstanding that fact, preserving the option of litigation allows 
subscribers to get full procedural due process if they want it. 
3. Predictable Application of Established Legal Standards 
Procedural fairness is of course only part of the equation when 
it comes to the fair resolution of disputes.  Substantive fairness is 
also required.  Under the MOU, the substantive legal rules to be 
applied in independent review proceedings come from “prevailing 
legal principles as determined by United States federal courts” and 
interpreted by the AAA-commissioned, CCI-board-approved 
independent expert.284  As of this writing, that expert has not been 
publicly identified, so it is impossible to assess his or her 
independence and credentials.  Whoever is chosen, however, is 
required by the MOU to receive input from the copyright owner 
representatives concerning their interpretation of “prevailing legal 
 
“embedded neutrals.” LaFrance, supra note 140, at 183 (citing a study by Nancy Welsh 
on bias in arbitration). 
 282 Cf. Carter Dougherty, Consumers May See New Limits on Mandatory Arbitration, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (May 21, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-21/ 
consumers-may-see-new-limits-on-mandatory-arbitration.html (reporting on the ubiquity 
of mandatory arbitration provisions in contracts for consumer financial services). 
 283 As John M. Owen points out, the remedies available under CAS are less harsh than 
the remedies available at law. See John M. Owen, Graduated Response and the Market 
for Copyrighted Works, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 559, 608 (2012). 
 284 MOU, supra note 11, at 35. 
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principles.”285  This mandate raises doubts about the extent to 
which the expert’s independence will be respected and sustained. 
The prospect that the expert will be captured is a real one, 
particularly in light of the fact that there is no provision in the 
MOU for public disclosure of the outline of applicable legal 
principles the expert is required to prepare and maintain.286  When 
potentially biased interpretations of the law govern an arbitral 
process potentially subject to repeat-player bias, there is good 
reason to doubt that outcomes will be substantively fair.  The 
RIAA has put forward some demonstrably unsound interpretations 
of copyright law over the years.  Its web site states, for example, 
that “making unauthorized copies of copyrighted music recordings 
is against the law” and that “many peer-to-peer (P2P) programs” 
have been held by courts to “inherently amount to copyright 
infringement and therefore constitute a crime.”287  Anyone who 
understands the complexities of fair use, the law concerning dual-
use copying technologies, and the difference between civil and 
criminal infringement knows that those are far from accurate 
statements of prevailing legal principles.288  If such statements are 
among the legal principles that will govern appeals under CAS, 
 
 285 See id. (providing that parties to the MOU must be given a means to “provide input 
[on material questions of law] . . . so as to ensure that the expert’s determinations are 
fully-informed and reflect prevailing laws as determined by United States federal 
courts”). 
 286 See id. (requiring the copyright expert “to outline [and update from time to time] 
prevailing legal principles of fair use . . . and any other legal principles necessary for 
resolution of issues within the scope of the Independent Review process”). 
 287 The Law, RIAA, https://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php?content_selector= 
piracy_online_the_law (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
 288 Operators of P2P file sharing services such as Napster, Grokster, and LimeWire 
have been found civilly liable for the copyright infringements of their users, but there has 
never been a legal decision that P2P software is inherently unlawful or that the use of 
such software necessarily constitutes an infringement, let alone a criminal one. See, e.g., 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc., v. Grokster Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005) (“[O]ne 
who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as 
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable 
for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”); A&M Records Inc., v. Napster 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Napster may be vicariously liable when it 
fails to affirmatively use its ability to patrol its system and preclude access to potentially 
infringing files listed in its search index.”); Artista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 
784 F. Supp. 2d 398, 436–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding LimeWire liable for inducing 
copyright infringement).  
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then CAS can have no credible claim to legitimacy and 
impartiality. 
Compounding the problems of potential expert capture and 
opaque rules of decision, no written opinions will issue from the 
independent review process, which means there is really no way 
for any member of the public to determine whether the rules, 
whatever they are, are being applied consistently across cases.289  
The system’s lack of transparency, which will be discussed at 
greater length below in Part IV.E, undermines substantive fairness.  
To address the transparency issues related to adjudication under 
CAS, CCI should disclose the identity of the AAA-commissioned 
independent expert, so that members of the public can assess his or 
her independence and credentials.  CCI should also disclose the 
substantive rules that will be applied by AAA independent 
reviewers.  While it would be ideal for written decisions to be 
recorded and published to ensure consistency across time and 
cases, such a practice would likely detract more from efficiency 
than it would add to fairness.  The public needs to know, however, 
whether the independent reviewer’s rules of decision come from 
copyright law or from the RIAA, because they are apparently not 
the same rules. 
4. Availability of Defenses 
The Copyright Act provides a range of defenses and exceptions 
to copyright infringement.  While the exclusive rights of copyright 
owners are fully enumerated in just two sections of code, section 
106 and section 106A, the following sixteen sections—107 
through 122—enumerate a wide range of limitations that are 
crucial for maintaining a balanced copyright system.290  CAS, by 
contrast, permits a subscriber to raise only six defenses, and only 
two of those—fair use and publication before 1923—are grounded 
directly in copyright law.291 
 
 289 See MOU, supra note 11, at 34 (“Reviewers shall not prepare written decisions in 
the cases they decide.”).  If, however, a subscriber who raises a defense does not prevail, 
the MOU requires the reviewer to prepare a “short description of the rationale for the 
denial.” Id. at 33.  The rationale is disclosed to the subscriber but not to the public. See id. 
 290 Id.  
 291 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (fair use); 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–304 (2006) (duration). 
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It is true that many of the defenses and exceptions provided in 
the Copyright Act are not relevant to the lion’s share of 
infringement claims arising from P2P file sharing.  But CAS, on 
principle, should permit a subscriber to raise any relevant defense 
that is cognizable under the law of copyrights.  There are, for 
example, several reasons for which a work can be in the public 
domain that are unrelated to publication before 1923, which is the 
only out-of-copyright scenario the MOU contemplates.  Works in 
the public domain include those published between 1923 and 1963 
whose copyrights were not renewed, works published before 1989 
without proper copyright notices, and most works created by the 
U.S. government.292  The rules concerning lapse and loss of 
protection are complicated, even byzantine, but they are 
nevertheless the rules.  If the substantive law of the independent 
review under CAS is U.S. copyright law, as it should be, then all 
relevant provisions of U.S. copyright law should be the law of 
CAS. 
To summarize, when it comes to the norm of fairness CAS 
leaves much to be desired.  With respect to procedural fairness, the 
system lacks the presumption of innocence, although it does allow 
for an appeal to a third party neutral before any sanction imposed.  
The third party neutral is structurally independent but nevertheless 
subject to the potential biases associated with mass consumer 
arbitration.  The saving fact for procedural fairness under CAS is 
that subscribers are not asked to waive their right to relief through 
the courts.  Regarding substantive fairness, CCI’s failure to 
disclose the rules that will govern appeals makes it impossible for 
the public to know whether those rules adequately capture the 
nuances of copyright law and accurately reflect existing case law.  
Finally, the defenses available to subscribers are unduly limited 
and fail to align completely with copyright law.293 
 
 292 See Pamela Samuelson, Reforming Copyright Is Possible, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. 
(D.C.), July 9, 2012, available at http://chronicle.com/article/Reforming-Copyright-
Is/132751 (listing the various ways that works can fall into the public domain). 
 293 Mary LaFrance has also criticized CAS for placing limits on available defenses. See 
LaFrance, supra note 13940, at 175–76. 
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D. Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality, a close cousin of substantive 
fairness, is expressly incorporated into the EU Copyright Directive, 
which provides that sanctions and remedies for copyright 
infringement should be “effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive.”294  When the ECJ analyzes legislation to determine 
whether it conforms with the principle of proportionality, it 
considers three factors: (1) whether the law in question is 
necessary to accomplish its articulated goal, (2) whether the law is 
suitable in terms of the relationship it establishes between ends and 
means, and (3) whether it imposes an excessive burden on the 
individual at whose conduct it is directed.295  Three strikes 
protocols that culminate in disconnection have been found by the 
EU Data Protection Supervisor to violate the principle of 
proportionality,296 although the Irish High Court reached the 
opposite conclusion in the Eircom case.297 
As a form of private legislation, the MOU invites analysis of 
the proportionality of the sanctions it incorporates.  The 
proportionality assessment for CAS is markedly different than for 
either Hadopi or Eircom, however, because CAS doubles the 
number of strikes that precede a sanction, and CAS is unlikely to 
entail suspension of access.  In these important respects, CAS is 
less draconian than its European counterparts, and its moderation 
makes for a better fit between the wrong and the remedy.  This 
question of fit is at the core of the proportionality analysis.  As the 
brief analysis below will demonstrate, CAS is proportionate as an 
approach to combating P2P infringement. 
 
 294 Directive 2001/29, art. 8, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 18 (EC). 
 295 See Tor-Inge Harbo, The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law, 16 
EURO. L.J. 158, 165 (2010) (“According to the conventional understanding of the 
proportionality principle, it consists of three tests applied to the allegedly infringing 
measure, respectively the suitability, the necessity and the proportionality stricto sensu 
test.”). 
 296 See Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, supra note 64, at 5. 
 297 See EMI Records v. Eircom Ltd., [2010] IEHC 108, ¶ 30 (H. Ct.) (Ir.) (“There is 
nothing disproportionate . . . about cutting off internet access because of three 
infringements of copyright.”). 
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1. Necessity 
The stated goals of CAS are education and deterrence.  
Privately administered graduated response protocols represent one 
way, but by no means the only way, to achieve those twin goals.  
The argument for the necessity of graduated response as a deterrent 
is based on mounting empirical evidence that other means haven’t 
worked.  Mass litigation against end users had only limited 
deterrent effects.298  And the various provisions of the DMCA that 
were intended to control online infringement—the repeat infringer, 
notice-and-takedown, and pre-litigation subpoena provisions—all 
proved inapplicable to the P2P distribution scenario.299  As the 
limits of public law for fighting P2P infringement have been 
revealed, the case for turning to privately administered graduated 
response as an alternative model of enforcement has become 
stronger.  There is no doubt that supply-side interventions continue 
to be necessary in the form of increased offerings of lawful content 
to consumers at reasonable prices across delivery platforms.  It 
would be unfair, however, to foreclose new models of enforcement 
when existing ones have fallen short and the problem remains a 
serious one.  Graduated response is not strictly necessary for 
enforcing copyrights online, but a properly calibrated system of 
privately administered warnings and sanctions is reasonable to try 
in light of past failures. 
2. Suitability 
As a means to achieving the ends of education and deterrence, 
the notice and sanction framework in CAS satisfies the test of 
suitability.  With respect to education, copyright alerts containing 
escalating rhetoric under CAS provide information to users about 
copyright law and the sanctions for violating it.  After receiving 
two notices, users must personally acknowledge having read and 
assimilated that information.  In addition, one of the sanctions 
contemplated under the MOU is diversion to a web site requiring 
some form of interactive copyright education.  It is absolutely vital, 
of course, that the information about copyright law disseminated 
 
 298 See Bridy, Pirates, supra note 247, at 604 (citing a study by the Pew Internet 
Project). 
 299 See Bridy, supra note 3, at 716–25. 
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through CAS be both accurate and complete.  The dissemination of 
misinformation about copyrights would make CAS a damaging 
and unsuitable educational tool. 
With respect to deterrence, the preliminary evidence from 
Hadopi and Eircom is that very few users who receive a first notice 
of infringement receive any subsequent notices.  This suggests that 
the receipt of notices in the context of a graduated response system 
has a meaningful deterrent effect on infringers.  It will be 
important for CCI to monitor and disclose whether CAS has 
similar deterrent effects.  If evidence gathered over time shows that 
it doesn’t, then the protocol should be suspended as unsuitable. 
3. Burden on Individual Rights 
The third and final element to consider in assessing 
proportionality is the extent to which CAS burdens the rights of 
individuals in order to achieve its goals.  Because CAS 
contemplates a range of possible sanctions, and it is not clear ex 
ante which ones ISPs will choose, this part of the analysis will 
vary depending on each ISP’s implementation.  In general, the 
greater a sanction’s impact on a user’s ability to access lawful 
content and applications, the greater the burden it imposes, and the 
less the likelihood that it can be justified in the name of enforcing 
copyrights.  Sanctions affecting speed and service tier, which are 
likely to be the most stringent sanctions imposed under CAS, are 
much less burdensome than an outright suspension of access.  It 
bears noting in this context that the sanctions listed in the MOU, 
which target individual users only, are exponentially less 
burdensome to users collectively than a proposed sanction like 
DNS blocking, which makes entire web domains unavailable to all 
users everywhere.300  Given a choice between an enforcement 
regime that targets individuals and one that targets domains, the 
one that targets individuals will ultimately burden many fewer 
users and much less expression. 
 
 300 The controversial—and ultimately abandoned—Stop Online Piracy Act contained a 
provision requiring ISPs to block access to “foreign infringing sites” by disrupting the 
addressing system by means of which an Internet domain name resolves to its 
corresponding IP address. See Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 
102(c)(2)(A)(i) (2011).  
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E. Transparency 
Of the five norms on which this Article focuses, transparency 
is the one the MOU honors least.  The lack is evident in three 
discrete domains related to CAS—design, implementation, and 
outcomes.  Across these domains, an endemic lack of disclosure 
undermines the credibility of the system and the public’s 
confidence in it. 
1. Design 
The MOU is formally private law, and the private law that 
corporations make amongst themselves is generally not subject to 
public input.  The MOU is functionally public law, however, 
insofar as it requires specific and substantial changes to the terms 
of service that bind millions of broadband subscribers.301  
Moreover, the government’s overt blessing gives the enterprise the 
whiff of public law and raises further questions about the closeted 
nature of the undertaking.  Comparatively speaking, the process 
from which CAS emerged looks more like the deal-making process 
that produced the Eircom-IRMA settlement than like the policy-
making process that produced Hadopi.  The secrecy surrounding 
the MOU’s negotiation compromises the legitimacy of CAS and 
justifies Mary LaFrance’s description of the agreement as “a ‘black 
box’ industry compact.”302 
As law that is formally private but functionally public, the 
MOU should not have been negotiated entirely out of the public’s 
view and without any input from public interest groups.  One 
wonders in this regard about the timing of the advisory board 
appointments and why they weren’t made before the details of the 
agreement were hammered out.  From the point of view of 
transparency, it is commendable that the MOU itself has been 
made public and is available for download from CCI’s website.  It 
would have been much better, though, if the document had not 
 
 301 See Bridy, ACTA, supra note 10, at 576–77 (highlighting the public law effects of 
the EMI-Eircom settlement and the ways in which such private settlements undermine 
consumer protection). 
 302 LaFrance, supra note 140, at 167. 
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been introduced to the public and presented to the CCI advisory 
board as a done deal. 
2. Implementation 
The parties to the MOU have made some meaningful gestures 
toward openness with respect to the implementation and oversight 
of CAS: they published the MOU in its entirety, created a public 
web site for CCI, and publicly identified the members of both the 
CCI executive committee and its advisory board.  These gestures 
do not go far enough, however, when so much other vital 
information about the system and its operation remains closely 
held.  Of particular concern is the secrecy surrounding both the 
technology underlying CAS and the substantive rules that will be 
applied in the independent review program. 
CAS has been criticized by academics and commentators in the 
blogosphere for the lack of transparency surrounding its 
implementation.303  On the heels of this criticism, CCI released 
Stroz Friedberg’s “independent assessment” of the methodologies 
that will be used by participating copyright owners to identify 
infringing files and alleged infringers.304  The assessment, many 
details of which were redacted in the released version, includes 
several recommendations for process improvement, including the 
development of an auditing framework.305  The assessment 
predictably does not include any finding of technical inadequacy 
and concludes that the technology underlying CAS is “well 
developed and robust.”306 
It appears from the release of the Stroz Friedberg assessment 
that CCI intends to be more forthcoming and transparent than the 
MOU actually requires.  The fact remains, however, that secrecy is 
 
 303 See, e.g., id. at 166; “Six Strikes” Anti-Piracy Scheme Overly Secret and Unfair, 
Says Professor, TORRENTFREAK (Sept. 17, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/six-strikes-anti-
piracy-scheme-overly-secret-and-unfair-says-professor-120917 (quoting at length from a 
preliminary draft of this Article published on SSRN).  
 304 See INDEPENDENT EXPERT ASSESSMENT OF MARKMONITOR ANTIPIRACY 
METHODOLOGIES [REDACTED], Stroz Friedberg, Nov. 1, 2012, http://www.copyright 
information.org/sites/default/files/Independent%20Expert%20Assessment.Content.CCI_.
Redacted.pdf. 
 305 See id. at 2,11. 
 306 See id. at 2. 
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the rule in the agreement, and the independent experts hired to 
ensure the technical integrity of the system may not disclose any 
information about the copyright owner methodologies—even to 
the CCI advisory board—without express written consent.307  The 
secrecy to which the independent technical expert is bound is a 
genuine cause for concern given that a copyright owner can decline 
to adopt expert recommendations without breaching the MOU and 
can continue to send notices of infringement generated by systems 
that are unreliable, as long as they are not “fundamentally” so.  If 
the hiring of an independent technical expert is intended to build 
public confidence in the quality of the technology underlying CAS, 
then the expert should be permitted to disclose any unremedied 
findings of inadequacy to the advisory board, which should be 
empowered to require the parties to act on the expert’s findings.  If 
the independent technical expert’s findings can be disclosed only 
to the parties, which have no obligation to act on them, then there 
is very real reason to worry that those findings will simply be 
ignored.  The independent expert’s role in the system is not just to 
provide technical advice to the parties; it is to reassure the public 
of the parties’ bona fides and the technology’s integrity.  Secrecy is 
not compatible with that dual role. 
Secrecy is also the order of the day with respect to crucial 
aspects of the independent review program.  As discussed in Part 
IV.C above, it appears that there will be no information 
forthcoming from CCI or AAA concerning the identity of the 
independent copyright expert or the “prevailing legal principles” of 
copyright law that will govern independent reviews.308  This 
information should be disclosed to the public on the CCI’s web 
site.  Lack of transparency with respect to the independent review 
program seriously compromises the public’s perception of the 
fairness of the program and its independence from the copyright 
owner representatives, who are contractually entitled to bend the 
expert’s ear on matters of substantive copyright law.  Moreover, 
 
 307 See MOU, supra note 11, at 5 (“[T]he Independent Expert shall agree in writing to 
keep confidential any proprietary or other confidential information provided by the 
Content Owner Representatives and the Participating ISPs as part of the Independent 
Expert’s review.”). 
 308 See supra Part IV.C. 
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failing to publish the rules that will govern the independent review 
program is a missed opportunity to educate the public about 
copyright law, which is a stated purpose of CAS. 
3. Outcomes 
The MOU contains quite rigorous reporting requirements, but 
they are crafted to make the parties responsible to one another 
rather than the public.  In keeping with that design, there is no role 
to play in outcomes assessment for the advisory board or any 
independent auditor.  The reporting requirements associated with 
CAS exist primarily to enable CCI to verify the parties’ 
compliance with their respective contractual obligations.309  
Simply put, broadband subscribers are not among the MOU’s 
intended information beneficiaries. 
The MOU requires each participating ISP to generate monthly 
reports of anonymized and aggregated information concerning the 
number of alerts that were issued in the preceding month and the 
number of infringements alleged against each subscriber.310  It also 
requires each ISP and each copyright owner group to make 
reasonable efforts to submit semi-annual reports to CCI about the 
results of CAS.311  Using that information, CCI must conduct, on 
an annual basis, a program assessment that encompasses not only 
notice and sanction activity, but also the outcomes of independent 
reviews.312  The MOU provides, in other words, for regular and 
thorough assessment of the entire CAS ecosystem on an ISP-by-
ISP and copyright-owner-group-by-copyright-owner-group basis.  
All of this information flows into CCI, but it is unknown whether 
any of it will flow out to the public in any form.  Nothing in the 
MOU suggests that public disclosure about outcomes is part of the 
program. 
On the contrary, the secrecy requirements in the MOU that 
cover the technical infrastructure of CAS also cover data 
 
 309 See MOU, supra note 11, at 18 (stating that the CCI uses reports to assess “the 
number of ISP notices received and the number of corresponding Copyright Alerts sent,” 
which are part of both content owners’ and ISPs’ obligations). 
 310 See id. at 14–15. 
 311 See id. at 18. 
 312 See id. at 18–19. 
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disclosure concerning measured outcomes.  The MOU requires 
CCI to “maintain any reports or other information provided 
hereunder in the strictest confidence” and prohibits CCI from 
“disclos[ing] such reports or information to any third party or any 
Party other than the Party which originated the report or 
information, absent written consent from the originating Party.”313  
The MOU goes so far as to require CCI to seek a protective order 
from a court if information it has received from a party becomes 
subject to a subpoena or other legal process.314 
The level of secrecy maintained under the MOU with respect to 
program outcomes is excessive and, from a public relations 
standpoint, unproductive.  At the very least, the advisory board 
should receive the semi-annual reports submitted to CCI by the 
parties and should be privy to the results of CCI’s annual 
comprehensive assessment of CAS.  Optimally, CCI would be 
required to compile and publish independently audited annual 
reports about program outcomes. 
CONCLUSION 
CCI expects CAS to launch across participating ISPs sometime 
in early 2013—a delay over previous projections.315  When the 
launch does finally occur, assuming that it will, millions of 
Americans will become subject to a model of graduated response 
that appropriately places more emphasis on education than on 
punishment.  In what is ultimately a salutary development for 
consumers, CAS deviates from the “three strikes” orthodoxy that 
has dominated the global discourse on graduated response.  With a 
longer educational arc and less severe sanctions than its French and 
Irish counterparts, CAS raises a hope that the global enforcement 
agenda could evolve to embrace more tempered mechanisms for 
managing online infringement.  That would be a productive 
 
 313 Id. at 19. 
 314 See id.  
 315 See Jill Lesser, Dotting our “I”s, Ctr. for Copyright Information, Nov. 28, 2012, 
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/node/714 (announcing a delay in the expected 
launch date for CAS so that CCI can “be sure that all of [its] ‘I’s are dotted and ‘T’s 
crossed before any company begins sending alerts”). 
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development in a domain where better enforcement is often 
wrongly equated with harsher punishment. 
Measured against specific norms that are important to Internet 
users, however, CAS earns mixed marks.  On the positive side, it 
does not involve content blocking or filtering, and it is unlikely to 
result in even a temporary suspension of Internet access for any 
accused repeat infringer.  In addition, it does not require ISPs to 
monitor subscriber traffic or to turn over identifying information 
about individual subscribers to copyright owners.  Finally, it 
provides an opportunity to appeal a finding of repeat infringement 
to an independent reviewer before any sanction is imposed, 
without foreclosing the possibility of judicial process. 
On the negative side, there are insufficient safeguards in CAS 
to insure the accuracy of allegations of infringement, the fairness 
of the independent review process, and the independence and 
expertise of the various “independent experts” the MOU requires 
CCI to consult.  Moreover, there is no way for the public to know 
whether the program is meeting the goals established for it in the 
MOU.  Both Hadopi and Eircom have released information about 
outcomes, and it is incumbent upon CCI to follow suit.  Increased 
informational transparency and an expanded role for the CCI 
advisory board in the ongoing operations of CAS would go a long 
way to alleviate many of these concerns. 
 
